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THE LAW OF LAWYERS' CONTRACTS
IS DIFFERENT
Joseph M. Perillo*
The greatest Trust, betweene Man and Man, is the Trust of Giving
CounselL For in other Confidences, Men commit the parts of life;
Their Lands, their Goods, their Children, their Credit, some partic-
ular Affaire: But to such, as they make their Counsellours, they
commit the whole: By how much the more, they are obliged to all
Faith and integrity.**
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE common law of contracts frequently treats lawyers differently
from lay persons and even from other professionals. At times, the
judges who make the common law identify with the concerns of their
brothers and sisters at the bar, and a more favorable rule is put in
place than is created for others. As stated by Judge Earl of the New
York Court of Appeals, some of these rules are "device[s] invented by
the courts for the protection of attorneys against the knavery of their
clients."1 More often, the courts' treatment of lawyers' contracts re-
flects a policy of enforcing professionalism by showing their scorn for
the knavish conduct of scoundrels in the legal profession.
Policies other than the suppression of knavery are also at work.
The courts have forged rules designed to create respect for the legal
profession and confidence in the system for the administration of law.
In addition, major developments in twentieth-century American law
governing lawyers' contracts include the enshrinement of "client
choice" as a salient characteristic of lawyer-client relations and "law-
yer autonomy" in respect to competition among lawyers. Although
many have claimed that the practice of law has changed from a profes-
sional calling to a service business, and Russell Pearce has sounded a
clarion call to the legal system to recognize this change as a paradigm
shift,3 many striking dissimilarities between lawyers' contracts and
business contracts remain.
1. Goodrich v. McDonald, 19 N.E. 649, 651 (N.Y. 1889) (discussing attorney fee
liens on recoveries).
2. "Every year produces a fresh crop of [lawyer] scoundrels and renewed doubts
about the ability of the [legal] profession to police itself ... ." Anthony T. Kronman,
The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 1 (1993).
The assistant counsel to the Oregon State Bar reports:
Over the years the Oregon State Bar Client Security Fund has been called
upon to make reimbursement to claimants who have suffered losses arising
out of investments with or loans to their lawyers .... In the great majority
of cases, the lawyer abused the lawyer-client relationship by using the law-
yer's greater bargaining power and position as trusted advisor to induce the
client to entrust funds to the lawyer without adequate protection.
Marilyn Lingren Cohen, Entering into Business Transactions with Clients Is Full of
Potential Conflicts, Or. St. B. Bull., Dec. 1993, at 29, 29.
3. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Pro-
fessional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1229 (1995).
444 [Vol. 67
1998] LAWYER'S CONTRACTS ARE DIFFERENT 445
Lawyers have been and continue to be subject to special controls
from two sources.4 As officers of the court, they are subject to the
disciplinary and rule-making powers of the courts. As members of a
profession, they are subject to the ethical prescriptions formulated by
bar associations.5 When lawyers appear before the courts as litigants,
special rules laid down for lawyers in contract cases can be viewed as
extensions of the courts' powers to regulate the conduct of members
of the bar. Similarly, the courts' application, in contract decisions, of
disciplinary standards of conduct, can be seen as further extensions of
the power of the organized profession to guide or discipline the con-
duct of individual lawyers. The disciplinary standards and the special
rules of contract law for lawyers' contracts often are designed to pro-
tect clients, but frequently are devised to preserve the mystique of the
practice of law as a special calling.
As a result of lawyers' special role in the legal system, contracts
between lawyer and client receive different treatment than other con-
tracts. Similarly, rules governing contracts between lawyers have
unique features. While freedom of contract is the guiding principle
underlying contract law, contractual freedom is muted in the lawyer-
client and the lawyer-lawyer contexts. I have written:
It has been suggested that there is no law of contracts, or that if
there is, it ought to be done away with. The thrust of the argument
is that the variety of contractual contexts is so extensive and that the
social and economic needs of each kind of transaction [are] so dif-
ferent that a disservice is done if one attempts to resolve transac-
tional disputes by the application of supposed general principles of
contract law.6
Although I generally disagree with this suggestion, judicial treatment
of lawyers' contracts is the best evidence that there is some merit to
the proposition.
4. For an historical perspective, see Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity
to Modem Times (1953); Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England:
A History of Regulation, 48 Syracuse L. Rev. 1 (1998).
5. Although these prescriptions are promulgated by the courts, they are formu-
lated by bar associations; the courts' role in formulating them is largely passive. See
Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 2.3 (1986). Courts, however, have a ma-
jor role in the enforcement of the prescriptions. See id. § 3.1. The first of the national
prescriptions was the 1908 Canons of Ethics formulated by the ABA, and adopted in
some states by state bar associations, in others by court rules, and still others by legis-
lation. See i. § 2.6.2. This was followed by the 1969 Code of Professional Responsi-
bility adopted in almost every state, sometimes with variations, usually by the state's
highest court. See id § 2.6.3. Finally, the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct were formulated. Not all states have adopted the Model Rules. See id.
§ 2.6.4.
6. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 13 (4th ed.
1998).
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II. THE RETAINER AGREEMENT
A. Fragility of the Retainer Agreement
Contracts engender expectations, and contract law generally pro-
tects those expectations by rules providing for awarding of damages,
restitution, or specific enforcement; moreover, constitutional princi-
ples protect these expectations from government interference. 7 Rules
of tort law also protect these expectations from interference by third
parties.8
Consequently, it is somewhat surprising that a lawyer has no ex-
pectancy interest in a special retainer contract, that is, a contract
retaining a lawyer for a particular case. As explained by one
court, "[tihe contract under which an attorney is employed by a client
has peculiar and distinctive features which differentiate it from ordi-
nary contracts of employment."9 A leading text echoes the case law:
"It is now uniformly recognized that the client-lawyer contract is
terminable at-will by the client. For good reasons, poor reasons,
or the worst of reasons, a client may fire the lawyer."1 If the
client elects to fire the lawyer without cause, the lawyer is entitled
to recover in quantum meruit, but, subject to a few excep-
tions, she has no right to expectancy damages." Health care profes-
sionals are also inhibited from seeking expectancy damages, 12 but
7. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
8. See Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How it Is Engulfing Commercial
Law, Why This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1175
(1996).
9. Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 47 (N.Y. 1916).
10. Wolfram, supra note 5, § 9.5.2. Texas appears to be an exception to the state-
ment in the text. See Johnson v. California Real Estate Inv. Trust, 912 F.2d 788, 788-89
(5th Cir. 1990) (holding a client liable for attorney's fees after the client terminated a
contract without good cause); Craig N. Adams, Comment, Clients Beware: Texas
Courts Allow Discharged Attorneys to Recover in Full Under Contingent Fee Con-
tracts, 22 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1159 (1991).
11. Martin, 114 N.E. at 48. The Court indicated that damages might be awarded if
the contract induced an attorney to "change[ ] his position," id., or for breach of a
general retainer. See id.; see also Atkins & O'Brien LLP v. ISS Int'l Serv. Sys., Inc.,
1998 WL 411400, at *3-*4 (N.Y. App. Div. July 23, 1998) (affirming a lower court's
denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint alleging a change of position); Lester Brick-
man & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefindable Retainers: Impermissible under Fi-
duciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 149, 157-60 (1988)
(discussing what might constitute a change of position).
12. A search has turned up no cases where a health care professional has sought
damages for breach as opposed to compensation for work done. The closest cases are
actions by dentists who have sought and received payment for dentures that were
incomplete because of patient non-cooperation. See Giering v. Lemoine, 106 So. 2d
534 (La. Ct. App. 1958); Parvey v. Barasch, 142 A. 230 (R.I. 1928). The Patient's Bill
of Rights of the American Hospital Association provides: "The patient has the right
to refuse treatment to the extent permitted by law . . . ." Cyril H. Wecht, Medical
Ethics and Legal Liability 337 (1976) (quoting from the Amercian Hospital Associa-
tion's Patient Bill of Rights). It follows that if the patient has this right, the health care
professional has no right to expectancy damages.
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other licensed professionals recover expectancy damages for
breach.13
What happens when the client dismisses the lawyer for cause, or if
the attorney withdraws for cause? While the language of contract law
distinguishes between partial and total breach (or immaterial and ma-
terial breach), the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (the
"Restatement") and much of the literature, instead, concentrate on
whether there is "just cause" for ending the relationship.1 4 In deter-
mining the consequences of ending the relationship, the Restatement
focuses on grounds for "forfeiture" of compensation.' 5 "Forfeiture" is
a loaded term, connoting the seizure of what one had earned. A more
neutral approach would be to inquire whether compensation has been
"earned." One student writer who accepted the "forfeiture" charac-
terization has aptly concluded that the criteria defining misconduct
justifying forfeiture of fees lack coherence.16 In contrast to the rea-
sonably clear criteria in the general law of contracts for determining
when a breach is total, thereby justifying cancellation of a contract, 17
and restitutionary criteria in general contract law for determining
when a party in breach may have restitution,"8 the section of Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers that governs "Partial or Com-
plete Forfeiture of Lawyer's Compensation"'19 has the clarity of the
Milky Way as seen during a thermal inversion.
One thing about the provision is clear; it is lawyer-friendly. Even if
the lawyer engages in a "clear and serious violation of a duty to the
client," the lawyer may be entitled to some or all of the agreed fee or
quantum meruit.20 While in some jurisdictions, as discussed below,21 a
party who materially breaches a contract may have a restitutionary
recovery, this rule was forged for arms-length rather than fiduciary
transactions. After many re-readings of the Restatement section, one
concludes that all its verbiage simply states that the courts have total
13. See, e.g., Bernard Tomson & Norman Coplan, Architectural and Engineering
Law 233-36 (2d ed. 1967) (listing case briefs of damages recoveries).
14. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 49 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996). This document will be cited from time to time. Unlike most re-
statements it is a highly controversial document and has been subject to many lobby-
ing pressures. In general, it should be taken with the proverbial grain of salt. See, e.g.,
Lee A. Pizzimenti, Screen Verite: Do Rules About Ethical Screens Reflect the Truth
about Real-Life Law Firm Practice?, 52 U. Miami L. Rev. 305, 306 (1997) (discussing
section 204, a controversial provision).
15. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 49.
16. Nancy L. Sindell, Note, Toward a Uniform Systemn of Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 9
Cardozo L. Rev. 1859 (1988).
17. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 11.18; E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts
§ 8.18 (2d ed. 1990).
18. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 11.22; Farnsworth, supra note 17,
§ 8.14.
19. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 49.
20. Id.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 49-51.
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discretion on the question of whether the lawyer is entitled to com-
pensation despite a violation of the lawyer's duties to the client.
Other fiduciaries are not so privileged. The Restatement (Second) of
Agency provides:
An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct which is diso-
bedient or which is a breach of his duty of loyalty; if such conduct
constitutes a willful and deliberate breach of his contract of service,
he is not entitled to compensation even for properly performed
services for which no compensation is apportioned.22
My own reading of the cases results in a different summary than
that of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. As for the
lawyer who has been dismissed for his or her material breach, the pre-
vailing view seems to be2 that he or she has earned no compensation.
This is in accord with the traditional rule applicable to contracts in
general.24 Where the lawyer is disbarred prior to completion of the
retainer, some cases hold that the disbarment is the equivalent of a
material breach, and the lawyer can recover nothing.25 Others permit
quantum meruit recovery for services rendered prior to disbarment, at
least where the misconduct was unrelated to the particular matter for
which recovery is sought.26 These pro-lawyer cases differ from the
general law of contracts. In the general law of contracts, impossibility
of performance can be the basis for an excuse from performance and
for recovery in quantum meruit for part performance. Such an excuse
and such recovery are, however, not available where the event making
performance impossible is the product of contributory fault.' Thus, if
22. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469 (1957); see also id. § 456(b) (prohibit-
ing compensation upon agent's willful and deliberate breach).
23. The word "seems" needs explanation. Much of the language of the courts,
influenced more by disciplinary rules and the literature about these rules than by the
law of contracts, is couched in terms of "just cause" rather than of "breach." See
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers reporter's notes, at 759.
24. New York generally holds to the traditional view that a party who materially
breaches a contract is not entitled to recovery except where provided by statute. The
leading case is Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1881). See Collar City Partnership v.
Redemption Church of Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 651 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730
(App. Div. 1997) (noting that Lawrence v. Miller is still the law). Shockingly, this
traditional view does not apply to lawyers who willfully breach their fiduciary duties.
As stated in In re Rosenman & Colin, 850 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1988): "Where a re-
tainer agreement is unenforceable, the attorney is entitled under New York law to
collect the reasonable value of his services, notwithstanding that it was the attorney's
misconduct that precluded liability under the written contract." For extreme applica-
tion of this pro-lawyer exception, see Mar Oil, S.A. v. Morrissey, 982 F.2d 830, 840 (2d
Cir. 1993).
25. See Fletcher v. Krise, 120 F.2d 809, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1941); George L. Blum,
Annotation, Attorney's Right to Compensation as Affected by Disbarment or Suspen-
sion Before Complete Performance, 59 A.L.R.5th 693, § 3 (1998).
26. See In re Mekler, 672 A.2d 23, 24 (Del. 1995); Stein v. Shaw, 79 A.2d 310, 311
(N.J. 1951) (stating that a contrary result would unjustly enrich the client); Blum,
supra note 25, § 4.
27. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 13.15; Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 9.6.
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a dealer in grains is de-licensed because of fraudulent conduct, it is not
excused from its contractual obligations to purchase, despite the legal
impossibility to purchase. 8
We have seen that the client can generally discharge the attorney at-
will.a9 Can the lawyer sever the relationship on the same basis? Ac-
cording to the Restatement, the lawyer can withdraw without cause if
there would be no "material adverse effect on the interests of the cli-
ent."3 ° This is, of course, a startling departure from the general law of
contracts. The client's power to dismiss has been explained .3  No ra-
tionale is given in the Restatement commentary for the granting of a
similar power to the attorney, other than the fact that such a breach
by the attorney is merely "nominal. '32 But whether the breach results
in merely nominal damages may not be ascertained until well after the
withdrawal. My own reading of the law is that if a lawyer withdraws
without cause, the lawyer is entitled to no compensation,33 may be
liable for malpractice or breach of contract,34 and be subject to disci-
pline.35 If the damages are merely nominal, liability for breach and
discipline are unlikely to be pursued, but the inability to claim com-
pensation has real consequences for the withdrawing lawyer.
B. Nonrefundable Retainers
Because the lawyer has no expectancy interest in the retainer con-
tract, it follows that a contract based on payment in advance for serv-
28. See S & S, Inc. v. Meyer, 478 N.W.2d 857, 861 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
29. See supra text accompanying note 10.
30. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 44(3)(a) (Proposed Fi-
nal Draft No. 1, 1996). If the case is before a tribunal, the attorney must comply with
rules requiring notice to and permission from the tribunal. See id. § 44(4).
31. See supra notes 9-11.
32. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 44 cmt. h(ii). The Re-
porter's Note to comment h(ii), id., indicates that the provision is consistent with
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(b).
33. See Augustson v. Linea Aerea Nacional-Chile, S.A., 76 F.3d 658, 664-65 (5th
Cir. 1996) (holding that a firm that withdrew with court permission "for just cause"-
refusal of a settlement offer-could not recover as it did not have "just cause" for
purposes of compensation); Faro v. Romani. 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1994) (denying recov-
ery to lawyer who withdrew because client turned down a settlement offer); Dinter v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A.2d 1033 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (holding that
because the lawyer did not appeal, he was not entitled to quannum mendt); Shaw v.
Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., 499 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that a lawyer
who did not appeal was not entitled to file a lien against client for compensation
based on quantum mendt); George L. Blum, Annotation, Circumustances Under Which
Attorney Retains Right to Compensation Notvithstanding Vohntary Withdrawal from
Case, 53 A.L.R.5th 287 (1997).
34. See Alan Scott Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys' Fees: The Role of
ADR, 46 S.M.U. L. Rev. 2005, 2015 (1993) ("Clients also sue lawyers, and whether
the suit is denominated as one for malpractice, fraud, or breach of contract, a substan-
tial number of such cases turn on claims by the client that the attorney's fee is unwar-
ranted." (footnote omitted)).
35. See Walker v. State Bar, 783 P.2d 184 (Cal. 1989) (disbarring a lawyer who
abandoned his practice and pending files).
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ices is problematic where the services turn out to be less than
anticipated or totally unnecessary.3 6 Courts have "traditional author-
ity .. . to supervise the charging of fees for legal services under the
courts' inherent and statutory power to regulate the practice of law." 37
In exercising that authority, some courts have banned the use of
nonrefundable retainers because such a retainer acts as a brake on the
ability of the client to change counsel. 8 On the other hand, a general
retainer-an amount paid or promised in exchange for the lawyer's
agreement to perform legal services during an agreed period of time-
is binding in some jurisdictions.39 The general retainer, sometimes
called an engagement retainer, is a sort of an option to call upon the
lawyer's time.40 It can be argued, however, that even this kind of re-
tainer imposes costs on a client who would like to change counsel, and
thereby "obstruct[s] client freedom to discharge lawyers."41
Although general retainers are permitted and enforced by many ju-
risdictions,4" a trend is building to rein them in. In a Georgia case, the
client entered into a seven-year general retainer contract.43 The
agreement provided that it would automatically renew for a five-year
term. If the client exercised a termination power prior to the auto-
matic renewal, the client was to pay liquidated damages. The court
invalidated the contract as an impermissible evisceration of the "cli-
36. See generally Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 11 (arguing that most
nonrefundable retainers are unethical and illegal).
37. First Nat'l Bank v. Brower, 368 N.E.2d 1240, 1242 (N.Y. 1977) (citations
omitted).
38. See Wong v. Michael Kennedy, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 73, 80-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1994);
In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994); Wright v. Arnold, 877 P.2d 616,
618 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); see also Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (1993) (proposing a rule which
specifies that non-refundable retainers are impermissible as a matter of ethics); Lester
Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefiindable Retainers: A Response to
Critics of the Absolute Ban, 64 U. Cin. L. Rev. 11, 11 (1995) ("In the short span of
time since the New York Court of Appeals banned nonrefundable retainers, numer-
ous other courts have joined in prohibiting this widespread practice of lawyers charg-
ing a fee for services in advance and keeping the fee even if the services are not
performed." (footnotes omitted)). For a defense of the nonrefundable retainer in one
context, see David C. Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Scaling the Stonewall: Retaining
Lawyers to Bolster Credibility, 1 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 65, 71-74 (1996).
39. See Kelly v. MD Buyline, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
40. The retainer fee is for the option. Thus, the funds immediately become the
property of the lawyer. At times, the retainer is a hybrid by which the retainer fee
acts as an advance payment for the lawyer's time and the lawyer draws against the
fund. This is the client's money and belongs in a trust account. An attempt to make it
nonrefundable is invalid. See In re Gray's Run Techs., Inc., 217 B.R. 48, 57 (M.D. Pa.
1997).
41. Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 11, at 153 (footnote omitted).
42. The Restatement seems to recognize their enforceability. See Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 46 cmts. c-e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
1996) (discussing validity of "engagement retainer").
43. See AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 444 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. 1994).
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ent's absolute right to terminate."" Louisiana also recognizes a cli-
ent's unfettered right to terminate a general retainer." A New Jersey
case struck down a yearly retainer agreement that annually renewed
unless six months notice of termination was given but, in calculating
recovery, ruled that one month's notice of termination would have
been reasonable.46 This represents a more nuanced judgment than an
all-or-nothing approach. The court noted that "it would be counter-
productive to preclude clients from bargaining for a reduction in fees
in exchange for a reasonable limitation on the right to discharge a
lawyer.
47
Professors Brickman and Cunningham have argued that the rule
against nonrefundable retainers is consistent with general contract
law.4 Their thesis is that such retainers violate standard contract
rules barring penalty clauses and also run afoul of the law's abhor-
rence of forfeitures. The accuracy of this argument depends on which
state's common law of contracts is applicable. The classical view is
that a party in default cannot get restitution for services rendered or
money paid. Thus, under the classical view of contract law, a
nonrefundable retainer would be treated neither as a penalty nor as a
forfeiture. In contrast, the modern view allows quantum meruit recov-
ery to a breaching party to the extent that this sum exceeds the ag-
grieved party's damages. 49 The conflict among jurisdictions is so
pronounced that even Palmer on Restitution is unable to sort out
whether the traditional view or the modem view prevails.50 Some-
times, both views coexist in the same jurisdiction-one view for con-
struction contracts standing beside the opposite view for employment
contracts. 51
Whether or not the rule against nonrefundable retainers is consis-
tent with the general common law of the jurisdiction, the prohibition
is a sound one. In the great majority of cases involving the formation
of the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and client, only the
lawyer can foresee the time and effort necessary to bring the matter to
a conclusion. If, because of the lawyer's innocent or negligent failure
to foresee these facts with any degree of accuracy, far less time and
effort are needed, there is no rational reason to place the risk of the
lawyer's miscalculation on the client. Similarly, if the client wishes to
44. Id. at 317. As an alternative ground, the court held that the liquidated dam-
ages clause was an invalid penalty.
45. See Keene v. Reggie, 701 So. 2d 720, 727 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
46. See Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, 679 A.2d 1188, 1200 (NJ.
1996).
47. Id at 1198.
48. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 11, at 176-89.
49. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 11.22; Farnsworth, supra note 17,
§ 8.14.
50. See 1 George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution § 5.1 (1978).
51. See id §§ 5.13-.14.
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withdraw from the retainer, recovery by the client of the unearned
portion of the fee would be consistent with the law's willingness to
allow clients the freedom to change representation.
C. Fee Regulation
1. The Fee Agreement
Disciplinary rules require the lawyer to inform the client of the ba-
sis or rate of the fee that will be charged.5" Putting disciplinary conse-
quences aside, the lawyer who fails to comply with this requirement
will be relegated to compensation on the basis of quantum meruit.53
There are a number of different ways to measure quantum meruit.54
In the absence of an agreement on fees, the Restatement provides
that "the lawyer is entitled to recovery only at the lower range of what
otherwise would be a reasonable negotiated fee."55 The purpose of
the requirement that the lawyer promptly furnish fee information is to
give the client an early opportunity to decide whether to seek out an-
other lawyer.56
In any dispute, the "tribunal should construe an agreement between
client and lawyer as a reasonable person in the circumstances of the
client would have construed it."57 Moreover, the lawyer has the bur-
den of persuasion on all issues concerning the propriety and reasona-
bleness of the fee.58 The reasons for this are multiple.59 In almost
every case, it is the lawyer who will draft or articulate the contract.60
The lawyer is undertaking to become a fiduciary and the lawyer-client
contract charts the course of the relationship.6" Also, the lawyer
52. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(b) (1994) (providing an
exception for a former client who understands the basis or rate); Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers § 50(1) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); cf. Model
Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-10 (1980) (stating that a lawyer should en-
sure that the information in any advertising is disseminated clearly and objectively).
But see Lawrence A. Dubin, Client Beware: The Need for a Mandatory Written Fee
Agreement Rule, 51 Okla. L. Rev. 93 (1998) (urging promulgation of a rule requiring
written fee agreements).
53. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 50 cmt. b; see also
In re Santemma, 660 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that an attorney
who fails to carry the burden of proof as to the existence of a contingent fee agree-
ment can only recover on a quantum meruit basis); Neals v. Cox, 658 N.Y.S.2d 1007,
1007 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that a lawyer, who did not prove the number of hours
she worked on a case, is not entitled to compensation).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 117-18.
55. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51 cmt. b(ii).
56. See id. § 50 cmt. b.
57. Id. § 29A(2).
58. See id. § 54.
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should be more able than the client to foresee and clarify the risks of
the representation.62
The Restatement also deals with lawyer-client fee agreements that
are made or modified after the representation is underway. Such
contracts deserve stricter scrutiny because the client's bargaining
power at this stage of the representation is often weak indeed.' The
lawyer's position at this stage of the representation may well be close
to that of a monopolist. A change of lawyers is nearly unthinkable at
certain stages of a case. Nonetheless, there may be a genuine benefit
to the client in, say, a change from an hourly basis to a contingent fee
where the case has become more complex than either party had
anticipated.a5
Typically, however, the lawyer may be seeking to modify the fee
upward offering neither any concomitant benefit to the client nor a
shift of the risks previously assumed. The pre-existing duty rule of
contract law, recognized by most jurisdictions, 6 would hold such a
modification ineffective. The Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Contracts, however, espouses a minority view that a modification is
enforceable without additional consideration due to an unanticipated
change of circumstances making a contractual task more onerous or
more valuable, and the modification is fair and equitable.67 Taking
the Restatement of the Law of Contracts as its guide, the Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers regards modifications as binding, but
requires that the content of the modification, and the circumstances
under which it was made, be fair and reasonable to the client." Inas-
much as another provision of the Restatement requires fee agree-
ments to be fair and reasonable, the rule as to modifications must
mean that the change in contract terms must have a fair and reason-
able basis judged in the light of changed circumstances.69
2. Excessive Fees
As a corollary to the principle of freedom of contract, a general rule
of contract law is that the courts will not inquire into the adequacy of
the consideration.71 The parties make their own bargains and the
courts will enforce them unless the agreement is tainted by fraud or
62. See id
63. See id. § 29A cmt. e.
64. See id
65. See id § 29A illus. 2.
66. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 4.9; Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 4.21.
67. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89(a) (1981). This section is referenced
in Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 29A cmt. e.
68. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 29A cmt. h.
69. See id.
70. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6. § 4.4; Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 2.11.
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the like,71 or the imbalance is so profound as to be declared uncon-
scionable.72 However, lawyers' contracts are different. "Courts have
a stake in attorney's fees contracts; the fairness of the terms reflects
directly on the court and its bar."'73 The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct provide that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable."74 While
this and its predecessor are disciplinary rules, courts have generally
regarded them also as rules of contract law.75 An almost automatic
review of the excessiveness of fees takes place where the fee is
charged to the client's adversary. Such charges are authorized under
many contracts, especially leases and loan agreements,76 and under a
number of statutes.77
Applying the Model Code's disciplinary rule as a rule of contract
law, the Tennessee Supreme Court struck down a fee agreement that
provided for a $2500 retainer and a one-third contingency fee to se-
cure a widower's rights in his deceased wife's estate.78 The probate
court had refused to award the contingency fee and, instead, had
granted a quantum meruit recovery of $12,500. 71 The probate pro-
ceeding had not been very complicated and no novel issues of law
were involved.80 The Supreme Court agreed that the fee was exces-
sive, but held that the lawyer should receive no compensation, be-
cause such recoveries "would encourage attorneys to enter exorbitant
fee contracts, secure that the safety net of quantum meruit is there in
case of a subsequent fall."'"
71. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 9; Farnsworth, supra note 17,
§§ 4.9-.20.
72. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, §§ 9.37-.40; Farnsworth, supra note 17,
§ 4.28.
73. Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R.. 692 F.2d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 1982).
74. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a) (1994); see Model Code of
Professional Reponsibility DR 2-106(B) (1980); Restatement (Third) of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers § 46.
75. See Bauermeister v. McReynolds, 571 N.W.2d 79, 91 (Neb. 1997), modified,
575 N.W.2d 354 (Neb. 1998); Collier, Cohen, Crystal & Bock v. MacNamara, 655
N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (App. Div. 1997); In re Estate of Schuldt, 428 N.W.2d 251, 256 (S.D.
1988); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 46. An entire article
could be devoted to the topic of the use of disciplinary rules as the basis for decisions
in litigation other than disciplinary proceedings. Generally, the fact of violation of the
rules is not a predicate for a malpractice action. See Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271, 275
(N.J. 1998); Shaprio v. McNeill, 699 N.E.2d 407, 409 (N.Y. 1998).
76. See, e.g., John E. Theuman, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Attor-
neys' Fees in Matters Involving Real Estate-Modern Cases, 10 A.L.R.5th 448, § 4(c)
(1993) (citing many similar cases).
77. See Jane Massey Draper, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Attorneys'
Fees in Domestic Relations Cases, 17 A.L.R.5th 366 (1994).
78. See White v. McBride, 937 S.W.2d 796, 797, 803 (Tenn. 1996). But see Brobeck,
Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a
$1,000,000 fee was not excessive).
79. White, 937 S.W.2d at 799.
80. Id. at 797-800.
81. Id. at 803.
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As one judge has noted, fee disputes require particularly delicate
handling, "because of the public's concern that judges might sympa-
thize with their colleagues at the bar."' On the other hand, he con-
tinued, the practitioners may be concerned "that judges are unfamiliar
with the economic realities of modern law practice."83
To minimize the need for review of individual cases, some jurisdic-
tions have promulgated definite and specific rules for particular kinds
of cases (i.e., contingent fees, estate administration, and matrimonial
matters). Some states set maximum contingency fees usually based on
a sliding scale.8 California8s and New York, 6 among others, s regu-
late contingency fees in malpractice actions against health care provid-
ers by legislation setting a sliding scale of maximum fees dependent
upon the amount recovered. Arizonas and Iowa' require court re-
view of the reasonableness of fees in medical malpractice cases. The
above is just a sampling of fee regulation by legislation or court rule.
The disciplinary rule can be invoked in a disciplinary proceeding.
In Arizona, a lawyer took a tort case on a one-third contingency fee
basis.9° The liability of the intoxicated driver was clear; the client's
damages were severe. 9' The defendant's insurance carriers quickly
settled for $150,000, the full amount of coverage. 92 The lawyer did not
have to do much work.93 Because the plaintiff's injuries were job-re-
82. Alexander v. Inman, No. O1AO1-9605-CH-00215, 1996 WL 709369, at 15
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1996) (Koch, J., dissenting), reird, No. 01-5-01-9705-CH-
0010, 1998 WL 324610 (Tenn. June 22, 1998). An earlier appeal in this case is noted
by Austin B. Byrd, Case Comment, Family Law-Alexander v. Inman: The Tennessee
Court of Appeals Establishes Guidelines for Contingent Attorneys' Fees in Domestic
Relations Cases, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1575, 1578 (1996).
83. Alexander, 1996 WL 709369, at -5.
84. See, e.g., N.J. Gen. Application Rule 1:21-7 (West Supp. 1997) (setting maxi-
mum sliding scale for tort cases only), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 7 (West 1996) (capping
contingency fees at 50%); Fla. State Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i) (1993) (stating that
charging more than sliding scale is presumptively excessive), amended b.v Florida Bar
Re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 644 So. 2d 282, 305 (Fla. 1994),
and Florida Bar Re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 658 So. 2d 930,
936 (Fla. 1995); Attorneys at Law, 7 N.Y. Jurisprudence 2d § 213 n.21 (1997) (noting
that three of the four departments of the New York Appellate Division have estab-
lished rules setting scales for personal injury and wrongful death cases).
85. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146 (Vest 1990).
86. N.Y. Jud. Law § 474-a (McKinney Supp. 1998).
87. On a variety of grounds, such limits on medical malpractice fees have been
found unconstitutional by some courts. See Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Va-
lidity of Statute Establishing Contingent Fee Scale for Attorneys Representing Parties in
Medical Malpractice Actions, 12 A.L.R.4th 23, 25 (1982).
88. See 17B Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., Uniform Medical Malpractice Rules, Rule 3
(West 1997).
89. See Iowa Code Ann. § 147.138 (West 1997).
90. See In re Swartz, 686 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc).




lated,94 there was a large Workers' Compensation lien on the settle-
ment.95 As a result, under the retainer, the lawyer would receive
$50,000, the Workers' Compensation Fund $100,000, and the client
nothing. 6 Despite the lawyer's argument that the client would still
receive nothing had he reduced the fee, because the reduction would
inure to the benefit of the Fund,97 the court suspended the lawyer for
six months and ordered disgorgement of the excessive part of the
fee.9" Although the reduction of the fee would not have benefited the
client,99 the lawyer had violated an obligation to the system of
justice. 100
Aside from disciplinary rules, "there should be recognition of the
traditional authority of the courts to supervise the charging of fees for
legal services under the courts' inherent and statutory power to regu-
late the practice of law."''1 Thus, no reference was made to ethical
rules where a lawyer was denied a twenty percent contingency fee for
collecting on an uncontested life insurance policy by performing
"services of a menial class."'0 2
3. Adequacy of Controls on Fee Agreements
The substantive rules of law governing retainer agreements seem
stacked in favor of the client. The agreed fees must be reasonable.
The lawyer is subject to duties to disclose that are not placed on the
client. Burdens of persuasion in all disputes are on the lawyer. Are
these protections effective, or are they more like the proverbial mi-
rage of an oasis in the desert? Although the substantive rules seem
fair enough,1"3 the procedural mechanisms for the resolution of fee
disputes often prevent implementation of the client-protection rules.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1239.
96. Id. at 1240.
97. Id. at 1244.
98. Id. at 1248.
99. A sub-text is that the client could have benefitted if the lawyer had negotiated
with the Fund for a reduction of its lien in exchange for a reduction in his fee, appar-
ently a common practice in Arizona and a tactic suggested by a lawyer for the Fund.
See id. at 1244-45.
100. Id. at 1244.
101. First Nat'l Bank v. Brower, 368 N.E.2d 1240, 1242 (N.Y. 1977) (citations omit-
ted) (upholding lower court's requiring an inquest into legal fees agreed upon in con-
sumer credit transaction); accord Herro, McAndrews & Porter, S.C. v. Gerhardt, 214
N.W.2d 401, 402-03 (Wis. 1974) (reviewing circuit court's power to determine the rea-
sonableness of attorney's fees).
102. Harmon v. Pugh, 248 S.E.2d 421, 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
103. One observer thinks that the substantive rules need to be made more client
friendly. See Stephen Gillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Fails to Protect Unsophisticated Consn-
ers in Fee Agreements with Lawyers, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 581 (1997) (arguing that
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers' rules, as they pertain to fees, itemiza-
tion of bills, and the parties' roles in fee disputes, are inadequate because there are
too few bright line rules).
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Typically, the client in a fee dispute will need to hire a lawyer to
combat his former lawyer. The former lawyer's costs to pursue the
client for the fee or to defend in a restitution action may be close to
zero." The client's costs in legal fees alone will be considerable.'
Bar associations have created voluntary programs for the arbitration
of fee disputes largely to preserve the image of the profession by
"avoidance of the public airing of fee disputes."'10 These programs
have not been totally successful. They require the consent of both
parties, and, apparently, many lawyers are reluctant to submit to the
arbitral process.'" 7 A small number of states have made arbitration
mandatory for the lawyer if the client so requests.10 These rules have
withstood constitutional challenges that the lawyer has been deprived
of the right to trial by jury, to equal protection, to due process, to be
free from involuntary servitude, and rights under the contract clause
and antitrust laws. 109 The basic notion is that lawyers are officers of
the court and subject to court regulation. The public interest in "the
maintenance of public confidence in the judicial system" justifies the
slight curtailment of lawyer's rights.' 10
4. Lawyer Discharge and the Contingent Fee
American courts are nearly unanimous on two points: (1) the dis-
charge of a lawyer on special retainer is not a breach; and (2) the
lawyer who is discharged without cause is entitled to quantum meruit
104. The lawyer's costs will vary with the circumstances. A litigator may be able to
obtain the services of another litigator on a barter basis. This is not a zero cost but its
cost depends on the marginal value of the lawyer's time.
105. For a case involving a disputed $10,000 fee in a matrimonial action, see In re
Marriage of Pitulla, 491 N.E.2d 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), appeal after remand, 559
N.E.2d 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal after remand, 628 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993), appeal denied, 633 N.E.2d 14 (Il1. 1994). The cost of disputing this fee must
have been enormously greater than the amount in dispute. For the heavy burden on
clients in fee dispute litigation, see Special Comm. on Resolution of Fee Disputes,
American Bar Ass'n, The Resolution of Fee Disputes: A Report and Model By-Laws
2-4 (1974); Rau, supra note 34, at 2018.
106. George E. Bodle, The Arbitration of Fee Disputes Betwveen Attorneys and Cli-
ents, 38 L.A. B. Ass'n Bull. 265, 265 (1963) (Mr. Bodle served as Chairman of Los
Angeles County's Committee on Arbitration).
107. See Rau, supra note 34, at 2022-23.
108. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6200 (West 1990); Rau, supra note 34, at 2023
n.64.
109. See Guralnick v. Supreme Court, 747 F. Supp. 1109, 1110 (D.NJ. 1990) (hold-
ing that a mandatory arbitration system in New Jersey is both constitutional and does
not violate antitrust laws); Miller v. Purvis, 921 P.2d 610 (Alaska 1996) (finding that
the absence of an appeal does not offend due process); Anderson v. Elliott, 555 A2d
1042 (Me. 1989) (holding that bar rules mandating attorney-client arbitration to settle
fee disputes did not violate attorney's constitutional right to trial); In re LiVolsi. 428
A.2d 1268 (NJ. 1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a rule establishing an attor-
ney arbitration committee); cf. Shimko v. Lobe, No. 96APEI 1-1555, 1997 WL 746431,
at *7-*8 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997) (holding that a rule must be found reasonable
before lawyer will be bound).
110. Guralnick, 747 F. Supp. at 1115.
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recovery against the client. Consequently, a lawyer, who is discharged
without cause and whose agreed compensation was to be a contingent
fee, is entitled to the reasonable value of services rendered up to the
point of discharge and any severable portion of the contract that has
been performed."'
This simple formulation conceals a significant amount of chaos in
the decisions. Here are some of the issues: (1) whether quantum me-
ruit can be quantified as a sum in excess of what would be due under
the terms of the retainer;' 12 (2) whether, when a second lawyer is re-
tained on a contingency basis, the award of fees to two lawyers may
exceed the larger of the two contingency retainers; (3) whether, if the
client settles the case without the help of a second lawyer, the contin-
gent fee retainer is enforceable; and (4) whether the discharged law-
yer may obtain a judgment for quantum meruit before the contingent
fee case has been resolved.
I will not replicate the task of collecting the cases raising these is-
sues.1 3 Rather, I will try to show some of the bases of the conflicts in
the case law. The modern rule permitting the client to discharge a
lawyer without liability, introduced by Martin v. Camp,1 4 was
designed to implement the concept that the lawyer-client relationship
was not a commercial deal. The Martin court said the rule "is well
calculated to promote public confidence in the members of an honora-
ble profession whose relation to their clients is personal and confiden-
tial.' ' " 5 To implement this concept, the court held that the retainer is
terminable by the client at will." 6 The court held that although such
termination is not a breach, the lawyer deserves compensation for the
work already done on a quantum meruit basis.' 17
The chaos of the decisions applying the concept of quantum meruit
to actions brought by discharged lawyers stems in part from the gen-
eral confusion engendered by the term "quantum meruit." Some
think of the term as describing a particular cause of action. It does
111. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 52 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
112. The Restatement provides that the recovery cannot exceed the contract rate.
Id. § 52 cmt. d. But see In re Montgomery's Estate, 6 N.E.2d 40, 41 (N.Y. 1936) (find-
ing that the contract price is not a limitation on an attorney's amount of recovery).
For a discussion of this problem in general contract law, see Calamari & Perillo, supra
note 6, § 15.4.
113. See Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee When the Client Discharges a Contingent
Fee Attorney, 41 Emory L.J. 367 (1992); Michael L. Closen & Zachary A. Tobin, The
Contingent Contingency Fee Arrangement: Compensation of the Contingency Fee At-
torney Discharged by the Client, 76 Ill. B.J. 916 (1987); Annotation, Limitation to
Quantum Meruit Recovery, Where Attorney Employed Under Contingent Fee Contract
Is Discharged Without Cause, 92 A.L.R.3d 690 (1979).
114. 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916).
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not. It describes the proper goal for recovery--"how much is mer-
ited." The amount "merited" varies greatly with the context. To illus-
trate, compare two situations involving a service contract not
involving a lawyer. X agrees to design software for Y for the agreed
sum of $100,000. X then puts in time and materials worth $110,000
and has not yet completed the task. It is clearly a losing contract for
X. Consider two remarkably different possibilities: (1) because Y has
changed his mind about the project, Y repudiates, and the incomplete
work is worthless to Y; and (2) because it is a losing proposition, X
repudiates and quits the job, and the work done is worthless to Y.
In the first of these instances, where Y is in breach, X can sue for
damages or opt for restitution where the measure of recovery is quan-
tum meruit. In this fact pattern, the measure of quantum meruit will
be $110,000, the market value of Y's services and other costs. In the
second of these instances, some jurisdictions will allow a breaching
party such as X to bring a quasi-contractual action where the measure
of restitution is described as quantum meruit. Here, the measure of
recovery will not be $110,000. Instead, it should, at best, be zero, the
amount by which Y has been enriched. 11 8
Thus, quantum meruit is a variable instrument for justice. It must
be retooled for each specific context in which it is applied."'1 In the
context of recovery by the contingency-fee lawyer who is discharged
without cause, it is important to bear in mind that the goal is "to pro-
mote public confidence in the members of an honorable profession
whose relationship to their clients is personal and confidential."1 20 In
arriving at a formula, courts should consider the following factors.
First, the client is not in breach, thus no penalty should be attached to
the client's decision to terminate the retainer.1 21 Second, no judgment
in favor of the discharged lawyer should be rendered until the contin-
gency fee case is brought to a positive judgment or settled.'2 "[Tihe
contingent fee is the poor man's key to the courthouse door."'" To
make the client pay without a successful outcome would penalize the
client for having discharged the lawyer. 24 Third, in no event should
118. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 371 (1981). Since Y is in breach, X's
counterclaim for damages should bring X an affirmative judgment.
119. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 1.11; Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 2.20.
120. Martin, 114 N.E. at 48.
121. See id.; Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & Webster v. Lansberry, 629
N.E.2d 431, 435 (Ohio 1994).
122. See Lansberry, 629 N.E.2d at 436; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 52 illus. 3 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1. 1996).
123. Loraine Minish, The Contingent Fee: A Re-erarninae, 10 Manitoba L.J. 65, 75
(1979) (citing H. McNamara, 2,000 Famous Legal Quotations 215 (1967)).
124. See Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972); Saucier v. Hayes Dairy
Prods., 373 So. 2d 102, 116-17 (La. 1979); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bassett, 83
P.2d 837, 840 (Okla. 1938). But see Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 539
N.E.2d 570, 572 (N.Y. 1989) (allowing the outgoing lawyer to opt for quantum nIenit
compensation, payable immediately). Substantial fees are unlikely to be available
19981
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the combined fees of the discharged attorney and the successor attor-
ney exceed the amount of the originally-agreed-upon contingency fee.
A contrary rule brings the legal profession into disrepute and penal-
izes the client for substituting attorneys. On the other hand, if the
client discharges the attorney to collect the offered settlement and
freezes the attorney out from the final contingency, the attorney ought
to be able to recover the promised contingent fee.1
2 5
5. Referral Fees
Finders' fees and brokerage fees are normal phenomena of Ameri-
can business. Nonetheless, there are legal and ethical barriers to the
payment of such fees by lawyers. It is quite clear that contracts to pay
such fees to lay persons who steer clients to lawyers are illegal and
void.126 This rule is also applicable to other professionals, such as
physicians 127 and dentists2 8 who are barred from paying referral fees.
In this instance, lawyers are treated in the same fashion as other pro-
fessionals. Lawyers are also prohibited from forming firms with non-
lawyers where any part of the activities of the firms consists of the
practice of law.' 29
The rationale usually given for the prohibition of fee splitting with
non-lawyers is that "[a] person entitled to share a lawyer's fees is
likely to attempt to influence the lawyer's activities so as to maximize
those fees. That could lead to inadequate legal services."13 While
this rationale has some relevance to the rule prohibiting partnerships
from the client until the case is finally resolved, due to the realities of most tort litiga-
tion. The attorney's right to compensation will be protected by a charging lien. Typi-
cally, the outgoing attorney will opt for a portion of the contingency fee the newly
retained attorney will be awarded. The outgoing attorney's share is fixed by agree-
ment or by the court at the end of the case. See id. at 572.
125. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 454, 455 (1957); Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers § 52 cmt. c; see also Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barn-
hart & Shipley, P.A. v. Scheller, 629 So. 2d 947, 951-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(permitting recovery despite lawyer's violation of disciplinary rule).
126. See Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1154 (Ind. 1997) (holding against a
clerical employee who claimed a 5% share of cases she brought to her employer);
Vidrine v. Abshire, 558 So. 2d 288, 292 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Plumlee v. Paddock, 832
S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that an ambulance company owner was
in pari delicto with a lawyer); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 11(3) (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998). But see Shimrak v. Garcia-Mendoza, 912
P.2d 822, 826 (Nev. 1996) (holding that a private investigator may enforce a fee-split-
ting agreement with an attorney; the investigator was not in pari delicto).
127. See Practice Management Assocs. v. Bitet, 654 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (involving chiropractors and applying New York law); Practice Manage-
ment, Ltd. v. Schwartz, 628 N.E.2d 656, 658 (11. App. Ct. 1993) (involving
ophthalmologists).
128. See In re Toffler, 598 N.Y.S.2d 445, 447-48 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that a peri-
odontist's percentage lease with dentist-landlord constitutes illegal fee splitting).
129. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 11(1)-(2).
130. Id. § 11 cmt. b.; see also Wolfram, supra note 5, § 9.2.4 (discussing the rationale
underlying restrictions on fee splitting with non-lawyers).
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with non-lawyers for the practice of law, it seems wholly inadequate to
explain why contracts to pay referral fees to "runners"-ambulance
drivers, insurance brokers, private investigators, and the like-are for-
bidden. Such individuals are unlikely to have much control over the
lawyer's activities. Rather, the rationale against fee splitting with non-
lawyers is best expressed by the individual who played a large role in
creating the prohibition. Henry S. Drinker wrote, "[t]he duty not to
advertise or solicit professional employment is not strictly one owing
to the public, the courts, clients, or colleagues. It is a duty to the tradi-
tions and amenities of an honorable profession ....,13 a
Referrals by one lawyer to another are treated differently. The rule
is that a contract to pay an improper referral fee to a lawyer who
steers a client to another lawyer is void. 32 When the issue of the pro-
priety of a referral-fee agreement arises in litigation-usually when
the referring attorney seeks to enforce the agreement-most courts
look to the disciplinary rules. Under DR 2-107 of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, the fee is improper if the refer-
ring lawyer performs no services, or if the fee exceeds a proportionate
share of the total services.1 33 The later ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Rule 1.5(e), preserves the criteria of proportionate
service, but, as an alternative, permits any fee division agreed to by
the lawyers if both lawyers accept joint responsibility.'- The discipli-
nary rules also require that the client be fully apprised of the partici-
pation of each of the lawyers involved. The Model Code also requires
that the client consent to the fee decision. Some jurisdictions require
that the client's consent be in writing. The Model Rule merely re-
131. Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics at xii (1953). The prohibition was enacted as
an amendment to the Canons of Ethics in 1928. Id. at 215 n.31.
132. See Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 169 (1929); McFarland v. George, 316 S.W.2d
662, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958). But see Watson v. Pietranton, 364 S.E.2d 812, 815 (W.
Va. 1987) (holding that although a fee-splitting agreement is unethical, it is binding
between lawyers, relying in part on ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal
Op. No. 870 (1965)).
133. If some service is rendered by the referring lawyer, courts do not often address
the question of proportionality. See A. Stanley Proner, P.C. v. Julien & Schlesinger,
P.C., 520 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773 (App. Div. 1987) (holding performance of -some" work
sufficient); Wilson v. Lynch & Lynch Co., 651 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
("Case law in Ohio and elsewhere supports the proposition that because of its nature,
a contingent fee arrangement need not have the same proportionate relationship to
the work actually performed as would an hourly fee."); see also Belli v. Shaw, 657
P.2d 315, 319 (Wash. 1983) (holding that a disproportionate division renders the
agreement against public policy). When the issue is addressed, it is generally held that
"[a]s long as the agreement to divide the fee was based on a good faith division of
services and responsibility at the time of contracting, the fee agreement should be
binding." Rutenbeck v. Grossenbach, 867 P.2d 36, 37 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
134. See In re Kuslansky, 654 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397-98 (App. Div. 1997). Assumption
of joint responsibility makes the relationship between lawyers akin to a partnership
and subjects the forwarding lawyer to potential malpractice liability for the negligence
of the lawyer to whom the case has been referred. See Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 59 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998).
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quires client acquiescence. Failure to comply with the entirety of the
applicable rule, including writing requirements, may render the refer-
ral agreement void'35 and subject the lawyers to disciplinary sanc-
tions. 3 6 Usually the client is not involved in referral fee litigation, but
an occasional client has sued and received a judgment for
restitution. 13
7
The lawyer of record who retains trial counsel in consideration of a
portion of the contingency fee bears the burden of complying with
client disclosure and consent requirements and, therefore, cannot re-
fuse payment on the ground of his or her own violation of the discipli-
nary rules.138 Similarly, if the lawyer to whom the case is referred had
promised to comply with the rule on behalf of both lawyers, that law-
yer will be estopped from arguing that the referral agreement is illegal
and void. 39
Exempt from the fee-splitting prohibition is the division of a fee
with partners of the firm. 140 Because of this exemption, some com-
mentators argue that "it is hypocritical to ban fee-splitting outside of
firms.'
14 1
The soundness of restrictions on referral fees can also be questioned
from the perspective of the client. The referring lawyer is almost cer-
tainly making the referral to someone more competent and exper-
ienced in the subject matter of the case. 1 42 Strict enforcement of the
135. See Kaplan v. Pavalon & Gifford, 12 F.3d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1993); Post v.
Bregman, 707 A.2d 806, 817-19 (Md. 1998); Christensen v. Eggen, 577 N.W.2d 221,
224-25 (Minn. 1998) (en banc) (finding a fee-splitting agreement void where a client
did not consent in writing and was not informed of the share each lawyer was to
receive); Lemond v. Jamail, 763 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). But see Free-
man v. Mayer, 95 F.3d 569, 575 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that despite the absence of a
writing, substantial compliance renders a fee-splitting agreement enforceable); Davies
v. Grauer, 684 N.E.2d 924, 929 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding substantial compliance).
While both the Model Code and the Model Rules require client consent, the writing
requirements differ in the two texts. For a more detailed discussion of the differences
between the relevant provisions of the Model Code and the Model Rules, see Curtis
L. Cornett, Comment, Ohio Disciplinary Rule 2-107: A Practical Solution to the Re-
ferral Fee Dilemma, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 239 (1992); Sheryl Zeligson, Note, The Referral
Fee and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Should States Adopt Model
Rule 1.5(e)?, 15 Fordham Urb. L.J. 801 (1987).
136. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-107 (1980); Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(e) (1994).
137. See Booher v. Frue, 358 S.E.2d 127, 129 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing the
payment of a referral fee without the client's consent).
138. See King v. Housel, 556 N.E.2d 501, 504-05 (Ohio 1990).
139. See Davies, 684 N.E.2d at 929; Chachere v. Drake, 941 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1996).
140. Both rules cited in supra note 136 state this exception.
141. Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by the Pervasive
Method 570 (1994).
142. See the eloquent concurrence of Justice Neely in Watson v. Pietranton, 364
S.E.2d 812, 816-18 (W. Va. 1987). It is of course possible that a busy lawyer may refer
a relatively minor case to a less experienced lawyer. The reported cases do not pres-
ent this scenario.
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prohibition would induce lawyers to handle matters in which they lack
expertise. 143 The ostensible rationale for the rule limiting fee splitting
is to protect the client against an unfair increase in legal fees to benefit
someone who has done little or no work."M While economic theory
might lead to the conclusion that referral fees add to the client's costs,
the data make it reasonably clear that the client does not pay more in
the typical case referred to a tort or products' liability specialist. 4 5
The specialist absorbs the cost of the forwarding fee because the refer-
ring lawyer has already winnowed the wheat from the chaff, 4 ' reduc-
ing the specialist's costs. 147 At any rate, both the Model Code and the
Model Rules condition the permissibility of a fee division on the rea-
sonableness of the total fee. 1
48
A related rationale is that restrictions on referral fees are designed
to deter referrals to the specialist who pays the highest referral fee
rather than to the most qualified specialist.' 49 It is difficult to under-
stand how this rationale bolsters the restrictions on referrals. None of
the rules require that the client be told of competing bids for the cli-
ent's case.150
An additional rationale that has been proffered is that the addition
of another lawyer widens the circle of individuals privy to the client's
143. See Rhode, supra note 141, at 569; Zeligson, supra note 135, at 813-14 (citing,
among other sources, New York State Bar Association Summary Report of Special
Committee to Consider Adoption of ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 6
cmt. 4 (Aug. 7, 1985)). While the statement in the text appears intuitively correct,
there is tension between the statement and "professional rules that require a lawyer
who is too busy or unskilled to handle a case not to accept it in the first place."
Wolfram, supra note 5, § 9.2.4, at 510-11 n.98.
144. See Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 172 (1928) (discussing the dangers of fee split-
ting); McFarland v. George, 316 S.W.2d 662, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 2,
1998).
145. Writing in 1953, Drinker takes notice of a longstanding practice to pay a refer-
ral fee of one-third of the final fee, and that this practice had been banned by the
Canons of Ethics. Drinker, supra note 131, at 186. Canon 34 provided: -[no division
of fees for legal services is proper except with another lawyer, based upon a division
of service or responsibility." Id. at 321. Three decades later, the ABA Journal re-
ported that "'[a] third of a third' is a common formula in [contingent fee] personal
injury cases." Referral Fees: Everybody Does It, but Is It OK?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985,
at 40, 40. The ABA Journal also reported that most lawyers thought referral fees
were appropriate. See Lauren Rubenstein Reskin, Forwarding Fees Are Fine with
Most Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 48, 48.
146. By way of analogy, a passenger pays no more for an airline seat bought from a
travel agent than the same seat sold by the airline. The travel agent relieves the air-
line from much of the time-consuming process of discussing variations in routes,
schedules, rates, and the like.
147. See Watson v. Pietranton, 364 S.E.2d 812, 817-18 (W. Va. 1987) (Neely, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
148. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-107(3) (1980); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(e)(3) (1994).
149. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 cmt. b.
150. "It is not a condition of validity that the client be informed of the terms of the
division." Id. § 59 cmt. e.
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confidences. 151 Yet, the client remains free under the disciplinary
rules, and under common-law doctrines concerning the delegation of
duties, to object to the farming out of a case. 5 ' It should also be
recalled that the client is free to discharge the lawyer, thus avoiding
the sharing of confidences.153
A totally different rationale for restrictions on referrals was given
by Henry S. Drinker, an earlier-day ethics czar: "The lawyer is not
supposed to get paid for anything but the legal services that he ren-
ders, and selling a man a client is not a legal service. I think it beneath
the dignity of the profession to take money for something that is not a
legal service."' 54 A reading of the cases and the literature leads to the
suspicion that Drinker's rationale-the preservation of lawyer dignity
and decorum-correctly describes the origin, and remains the basis of,
the restrictions surrounding lawyer referrals. The Restatement, after
decrying the danger of overcharging and voicing the fear that cases
will be farmed out to the highest bidders as rationales for "[t]he tradi-
tional prohibition of fee-splitting," adds: "[b]eyond that, the prohibi-
tion reflects a general hostility to commercial methods of obtaining
clients."' 5 5 In so adding, it reveals the real basis for restrictions on
referrals.
These restrictions are adjuncts to now defunct rules expressing hos-
tility to advertising and to other means of marketing the services of a
lawyer. They reflect what might be called the "mystique" of profes-
sionalism, rather than serve a rational purpose. 156 The evolution of
the restrictions from the Model Code's requirement of work propor-
tionate to the division of fees, to the Model Rule's allowance of any
agreed fee splitting if the lawyers accept joint responsibility, is a step
toward recognizing that referrals are useful business-like arrange-
ments for matching the client with a lawyer better able to serve the
client's needs.
6. Referral Fees-A Critique of Contemporary Doctrine
As discussed immediately above, several rationales have been of-
fered for restrictions on referral fees. Generally, the focus is on the
protection of the client, although the likely fundamental basis is the
protection of the dignity and decorum of the profession. Ironically,
the case law that implements the disciplinary codes in contractual dis-
151. See Texas Disciplinary Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 1.04(0(2) cmt. 10 (1989),
reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (West 1998).
152. The common law rules are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 160-
62.
153. See supra Part II.C.4.
154. Panel Discussion, The Determination of Professional Fees from the Ethical
Viewpoint-A Panel Discussion, 7 U. Fla. L. Rev. 433, 434 (1954).
155. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 cmt. b.
156. This observation agrees with many of Judge Posner's comments in Richard A.
Posner, Professionalisms, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1998).
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putes fails to protect either clients or the dignity of the profession. Far
from it! If the relevant disciplinary code is found to have been vio-
lated, and if, as most courts have done, the disciplinary code is found
to be a binding basis for decision in a contract dispute between law-
yers, either as a rule of law, or as a declaration of public policy, the
party benefiting is not the client. Rather, the benefit flows to one of
the two lawyers who jointly violated the disciplinary code, usually the
lawyer to whom the case was forwarded. Thus, the person benefited is
the paragon of virtue who has not only violated the disciplinary code,
but has also reneged on an agreement with the forwarding lawyer.
This is a scenario worthy of the creator of Alice's Adventures in Won-
derland1h7 and Through the Looking Glass.58 How has the client
been protected or in any way benefited? Has the dignity of the pro-
fession been rescued from the mud or has it been further sullied when
the reneging lawyer is permitted to default?
Assume for the moment that no disciplinary rule governed refer-
rals, and that the general law of contracts applied to a referral by one
lawyer to another. Assume also that the lawyer retained by the client
unsuccessfully attempts to obtain a reasonable settlement, determines
that further proceedings should be referred to a specialist, and makes
such a referral without consulting the client. What would be the rights
of the three parties involved-the client, the forwarding lawyer, and
the lawyer to whom the case has been referred? To start, the duty of
representing a client is a non-delegable duty.159 If the client has con-
tracted for the lawyer's services but has not consented to a referral,
the client owes nothing to the lawyer he has retained and nothing to
the lawyer to whom the case has been referred. The first lawyer has
not earned anything by performance and has materially breached the
retainer by farming out the case-delegating non-delegable duties.
The second lawyer proceeded without authority, is not in privity, and
earned nothing under the law of contract or quasi-contract." Typi-
cally, however, the client will be asked to consent to the referral and
will consent. If the express consent of the client is not sought, the
client will likely acquiesce to the referral by cooperating with the sec-
ond lawyer. Such acquiescence constitutes consent and waives the
non-delegability of the first lawyer's duties.1
6
'
The client's situation under common law, then, is exactly the same
as it is under the Model Rules. The Model Rule on fee divisions un-
157. Levis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Penguin Books 1960)
(1865).
158. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There
(1872).
159. "It is a principle universally recognized in the courts that a contract for legal
services is personal in its nature, and consequently unassignable." Corson v. Leqis,
109 N.W. 735, 736 (Neb. 1906).
160. See In re Zacoum's Estate, 115 N.Y.S.2d 42, 94-95 (Sur. Ct. 1952).
161. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 18.14.
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necessarily adds some redundant criteria that already exist under
other Model Rules and under the law of contracts. Rule 1.5(e) states
that the total fee must not be excessive. This adds nothing as it is
already an implicit term of the lawyer-client contract 162 and is explicit
in Model Rule 1.5(a) and DR 2-106. Rule 1.5(e) also states that the
forwarding lawyer must do a proportionate amount of the work or
accept joint responsibility. This adds nothing to common law require-
ments. When a lawyer assigns a retainer contract to another and dele-
gates all of his or her duties to another, such delegation does not
divest the delegant of his or her duties. It is basic contract law that no
obligor can divest obligations by transferring them to another.' 63 The
assumption of duties by the second lawyer creates new rights for the
client. Joint responsibility exists as a matter of law."6
The situation is different if the referring lawyer does not enter into a
retainer contract with the client, but merely directs the prospective
client to go to a specific other lawyer, and makes an arrangement for
the division of fees with the other lawyer, or has a prior arrangement.
In this instance, the referring lawyer has no contractual responsibility
to the client. Under the Model Rules, the referring lawyer would not
be entitled to a portion of the fee unless he or she does further work,
or the retainer with the lawyer to whom the case has been forwarded
includes a clause providing for the joint responsibility of the forward-
ing lawyer.
Naturally, lawyers experienced in referrals will routinely provide for
joint responsibility either in a retainer agreement with the lawyer the
client initially contacts, or in the retainer agreement with the lawyer to
whom the client has been referred. Consequently, the Model Rules
merely targets the lawyer who on rare occasion sends a prospective
client to another lawyer, and the latter does not protect the forward-
ing lawyer with an appropriate retainer clause. In addition, to activate
the rule in contract litigation between the lawyers, the lawyer to
whom the client has been referred must default on the agreement to
divide the fee. Such situations are likely to be rare.
If the recovery of the forwarding fee is denied, justice would dictate
that the defaulting lawyer act as a constructive trustee for the client in
holding the amount of the agreed forwarding fee. The requirements
for client consent and joint responsibility are ostensibly for the benefit
of the client. The suggestion made here would genuinely benefit the
client. Our system of common law and equity, however, is reluctant to
award a judgment to a person who has not actively sought it. None-
theless, an exception could be made by virtue of the power of the
courts to regulate the profession.
162. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
163. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 18.25.
164. See id. § 18.26.
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D. Retaining and Charging Liens
Lawyers are endowed with remedial tools for the collection of fees
that are not available to other professionals. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, the common law courts empowered lawyers to assert retaining
liens on their clients' papers and charging liens on their clients' judg-
ments or amounts received in settlement. 65 The retaining lien con-
sists of the lawyer's privilege to retain, with certain exceptions, the
papers, documents, and other personal property of the client which
have come into the lawyer's possession in his or her professional ca-
pacity.166 The lien continues until the lawyer's fee and disbursements
have been paid, or the client posts sufficient security assure pay-
ment.167 The power of retention is not limited to the lawyer's work
product; nor is it limited to papers enhanced in value by the lawyer's
efforts."6 The lien is discharged if the lawyer is suspended or dis-
barred, withdraws without cause, is discharged for cause, or commits
misconduct in the case.
1 69
Any power to assert a lien is capable of abuse. 70 While a lien may
be a just and legitimate instrument in aid of collection of fees that are
due, what if the lawyer is asserting a lien for a claim of an outra-
geously excessive fee? In one case, a lawyer, who demanded an exor-
165. See Welsh v. Hole, 99 Eng. Rep. 155 (K.B. 1779) (discussing a charging lien for
court costs); Wilkins v. Carmichael, 99 Eng. Rep. 70, 72 (K.B. 1779) (stating that the
retaining lien was a recent creation).
166. See Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Attorney's Retaining Lien: What Items of
Client's Property or Funds Are Not Subject to Lien, 70 A.L.RAth 827, 832-33 (1989).
167. See Restatement of Security § 62(b) (1941); Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of
Personal Property § 13.9 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975); Anthony W.
Overholt, Retaining the Retaining Lien After In re Gemmer, 36 Res Gestae 110, 114-
15 (1992); Note, Attorney's Retaining Lien over Former Client's Papers, 65 Colum. L
Rev. 296, 303 (1965); Margaret H. Tucker, Note, Attorney vs. Client: Lien Rights and
Remedies in Tennessee, 7 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 435, 437 (1977); Annotation, Rights and
remedies of Client as Regards Papers and Documents on which Attorney has Retaining
Lien, 3 A.L.R.2d 148, 150 (1949).
Where the lawyer who was retained on a contingent fee basis is discharged without
cause, the court may direct that the retaining lien be discharged and the papers turned
over to substituted counsel. In replacement, outgoing counsel will be given a charging
lien on any recovery. See Braider v. 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 654 N.Y.S.2d 755,
756 (App. Div. 1997).
168. Factors and bankers have retaining liens similar to those of lawyers. See Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 464(b) (1958). Other agents have retaining liens lim-
ited to those items that were connected to the principal's debt to the agent. See id.§ 464(a).
169. If a lawyer withdraws without good cause or is found to have committed pro-
fessional misconduct in connection with the case, the retaining lien is forfeited. See
People ex rel MacFarlane v. Harthun, 581 P.2d 716, 718 (Colo. 1978) (en banc); In re
Kaufman, 567 P.2d 957, 960 (Nev. 1977); Burnett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 765, 769 n.10
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc).
170. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 9.5. See generally Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 176(1)(c) (1979) (discussing when a threat to use legal process is
improper); Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 Pacific
LJ. 37 (1995) (discussing various abuse of rights scenarios).
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bitant fee and refused to turn over papers that were needed for the
consummation of a corporate takeover, was found guilty of duress; a
fee-settlement agreement coerced by the assertion of the retaining
lien was set aside.1 71
Where the client owes no fee, the assertion of a retaining lien is
unethical and the lawyer is subject to disciplinary action.172 Similarly,
the assertion of a lien coupled with a demand for an excessive fee is a
disciplinary offense. 73 Such results are predictable. More interesting,
however, are intimations that the assertion of a lien that is justified
under law may be unethical.' 74 There are intimations,1 75 yes, but little
in the nature of holdings. 76
Where the liberty interests of the client are at stake, the court may
order the delivery of the liened property to the client or the client's
new lawyer even if the lawyer's fee has not been paid,177 but where
the documents that the lawyer holds are subpoenaed for use in a civil
suit, the court will not discharge the lien unless the fee is paid or ade-
quate security for payment is posted.'78
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers takes a radical po-
sition on retaining liens-there are none-except where provided by
statute or rule of court.' 79 It recognizes that it has adopted a minority
171. See First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Pepper, 547 F.2d 708, 715 (2d Cir. 1976).
172. See People v. Garnett, 725 P.2d 1149, 1154-55 (Colo. 1986) (en banc).
173. See People v. Radinsky, 512 P.2d 627, 628 (Colo. 1973) (en banc) (disbarring a
lawyer for excessive fee demands); see also In re Gemmer, 566 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ind.
1991) (applying a disciplinary penalty for abuse of lien).
174. See generally Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Attorney's Assertion of Retain-
ing Lien as Violation of Ethical Code or Rules Governing Professional Conduct, 69
A.L.R.4th 974 (1989) (discussing circumstances in which assertion of an otherwise
lawful lien is unethical).
175. See Miller v. Paul, 615 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1980).
176. See Academy of Cal. Optometrists, Inc. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 668,
670-72 (Ct. App. 1975) (supporting the proposition while also holding that California
does not recognize a retaining lien).
177. See In re Hauptmann, 277 N.Y.S. 631, 631 (mem.) (App. Div. 1935) (requiring
the production of documents needed for defense of client indicted for murder in an-
other jurisdiction), modifying Hauptmann v. Fawcett, 276 N.Y.S. 523 (App. Div.
1935); cf. People v. Altvater, 355 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (allowing substi-
tute lawyer in murder case to photocopy documents held by unpaid predecessor who
retained lien).
Although the courts in the cited cases ordered delivery of the papers or other prop-
erty, the courts stated that surrender pursuant to such an order does not dissolve the
lien. Presumably this means that at a later point the liened property must be returned
to the lawyer. For a practical consequence of this rule, see Brauer v. Hotel Assocs.,
192 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1963). In Brauer, the court ordered that liened documents be
turned over to receiver of the insolvent client and the continuing lien gave the lawyer
a preference in the insolvent's estate. Id. at 834-35.
178. See Lucky-Goldstar Int'l (America), Inc. v. International Mfg. Sales Co., 636
F. Supp. 1059, 1061 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Bennett v. NSR, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1990) (summarizing relevant cases).
179. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 55 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
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view.'" It views the retaining lien as "in tension with the fiduciary
responsibilities of lawyers," which "could impose pressure on a client
disproportionate to the size or validity of the lawyer's fee claim."''
Despite the Restatement's condemnation of the retaining lien, in al-
most all jurisdictions it remains very much a weapon in the lawyer's
arsenal in fee disputes with clients.
In addition to the continued availability of retaining liens, charging
liens have survived in modern times. The charging lien is a security
interest that the lawyer has in a judgment or settlement brought about
by the lawyer's efforts.1 " It secures the lawyer's rights to fees and
reimbursement for disbursements. The lien also attaches to other
funds the lawyer receives for the client in the lawyer's professional
capacity. 18 3 The general rule is that the lien does not secure fees owed
by the client for services unrelated to the particular judgment or set-
tlement. 184 While some jurisdictions established this lien as a matter
of common law, others have established it by legislation." The abil-
ity to assert retaining and charging liens does not bar a wrongfully
discharged lawyer from bringing a plenary action for the agreed fee or
for quantum meruit18
6
There is no barrier to the lawyer securing from the client a record-
able security interest in the form of an assignment of the proceeds of
litigation. 87 Indeed, the Restatement seems to suggest that, in the
absence of a statute or rule, charging liens should exist only by con-
tract with the client."m The desirability of obtaining such a consensual
lien depends on state law. In case of the client's bankruptcy, the effec-
tiveness of the lawyer's statutory or common-law lien is determined
180. See id. § 55 cmt. b. For jurisdictions that do not recognize the retaining lien, or
that recognize a variant of it, see the Reporter's Note to section 55.
181. Id. § 55 cmt. b.
182. See Restatement of Security § 62 cmt. j (1941); Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 464(e) (1957); Brown, supra note 167, § 13.10.
183. See Brown, supra note 167, § 13.10. But no lien attaches to property interests
in the client's possession that a judgment determines that the client is entitled to keep.
See Rosenman & Colin v. Richard, 850 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1988).
184. See Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Atoruey's Charging Lien as Inchud-
ing Services Rendered or Disbursements Made in Other Than Instant Action or Pro-
ceeding, 23 A.L.R.4th 336, § 2 (1981). There are, however, exceptions. See
Twachtman v. Hastings, No. Cv. 95573075, 1997 WL 433878. at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 23, 1997); Wakefield, supra, § 4 (explaining exceptions in related matters); id. § 5
(discussing exceptions pursuant to special agreements).
185. See Brown, supra note 167, § 13.10.
186. See Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter v. Gelmin, 651 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (App. Div.
1997).
187. See Skarecky & Horenstein, P.A. v. 3605 North 36th St. Co., 825 P.2d 949, 952-
53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
188. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 55 cmt. e (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996). But see id. cmt. d (recognizing the existence of non-consen-
sual charging liens in some jurisdictions).
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by an interplay of the Bankruptcy Code and state law. 8 9 Because
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code excludes common law and
statutory liens from its coverage, 19 priority disputes outside of bank-
ruptcy proceedings are dependent on the vagaries of individual state
laws. 191
More complicated is the case where the client obtains a judgment to
which the lawyer's charging lien attaches, and the opposing party has
obtained judgment against the client either on a counterclaim or as a
result of a separate action. Ordinarily, the client's judgment on the
complaint and the opponent's judgment on the counterclaim would be
offset against each other. Consequently, the legal interests of the law-
yer and the client's adversary are in conflict. The question is, who has
priority-the client's lawyer or the client's adversary.
The issue has arisen a surprising number of times. 192 Most cases
have given priority to the charging lien. 193 The rationale is that the
existence of such a lien is designed to ensure that the impecunious
obtain representation. In contrast, a significant number of cases have
given priority to the judgment creditor. 194 Many of the cases, how-
ever, do not manifest any conflict in policies, but turn on local rules as
to when the charging lien and judgment lien attached, whether the
judgment arose under the same or a different transaction, etc.
In contrast to the ability of lawyers to assert liens, most other pro-
fessionals can assert neither retaining liens nor charging liens.195
While accountants have ownership rights in their own worksheets, in-
ternal memoranda, and the like, and, thus, can withhold such papers
from the client, 196 they may not withhold any documents furnished by
189. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1994) (providing that a trustee in bankruptcy may
avoid a lien in certain cases), with In re Hagen, 922 F.2d 742, 745 (11th Cir. 1991)
(noting that under Florida law, the lien is perfected at the time of the retainer), and In
re Electronic Metal Prods., 916 F.2d 1502, 1505 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that under
Colorado law, the lien is not perfected until notice is filed with the clerk of the court),
and In re Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 654 F.2d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that
under California law, existence of the lien depends on intention of the parties), and In
re 9 Stevens Cafe, Inc., 161 B.R. 96, 97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that under
New York law the lien takes effect from the time services were commenced).
190. U.C.C. § 9-104 (1990). But see id. § 9-310 (covering certain liens such as repair-
man's liens and landlord's liens but specifically excluding statutory liens).
191. See John H. Derrick, Annotation, Priority Between Attorney's Lien for Fees
Against a Judgment and Lien of Creditor Against Same Judgment, 34 A.L.R.4th 665
(1984).
192. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Priority Between Attorney's Charging Lien
Against Judgment and Opposing Party's Right of Setoff Against Same Judgment, 27
A.L.R.5th 764, §§ 3-4 (1995).
193. See id. § 3.
194. See id. § 4.
195. But see supra note 168 (discussing liens held by factors, bankers, and agents).
196. See A. Petry, Annotation, Ownership of, and Literary Property in, Working
Papers and Data of Accountant, 90 A.L.R.2d 784 (1963). They may be compelled to
turn over such papers to a trustee in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (1994). On
the other hand, under the majority rule, clients who have paid their fees are presump-
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the client nor any final work product such as a tax return or audit.1 97
They have no lien by virtue of common law, nor has the power to
assert a lien been conferred by legislation.19s A manual published for
accountants states in a bolded sidebar: NEVER WITHHOLD CLIENT
RECORDS.' 9 9 The manual cites cases involving disciplinary action
against accountants for attempting to withhold their work product as
leverage to obtain their fees.2"' As to other professions, there seem to
be no cases where architects, engineers, physicians, or surveyors have
attempted to assert a retaining lien or a charging lien,201 although
under standard contract principles they may refuse to hand over their
tively entitled to all papers in their lawyer's files and access to all papers in their
pending files. See Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn,
L.L.P., 689 N.E.2d 879, 881 (N.Y. 1997): Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 58 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). But see Brian J. Slovut, Note, Elifni-
nating Conflict at the Termination of the Attorney-Client Relationship: A Proposed
Standard Governing Property Rights in the Client's File, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1483, 1483-
84, 1494-97, 1504-09 (1992) (stating that the court disagree as to the extent of the
client's property rights in their files and arguing for only a limited property right).
197. See Hyer v. Forte, 384 N.Y.S.2d 946, 947 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Park Place-Dodge
Corp. v. Collins, 346 N.Y.S.2d 949, 954-55 (Sup. Ct. 1973). afJd, 352 N.Y.S.2d 910
(mem.) (App. Div. 1974); George v. Walton, 43 N.E.2d 515, 517-18 (Ohio Ct. App.
1942); R.F. Cox, Annotation, Right of Accountants to Lien Upon Client's Books and
Records in Former's Possession, 76 A.L.R.2d 1322 (1961).
198. Retaining liens pursuant to statute are referred to in Porta-John Corp. v.
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 523 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd on other
grounds, 539 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. 1995), and Goethel v. First Properties International,
LttL, 363 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). These statutes, however,
merely codify the accountant's common law property rights referred to supra in the
text accompanying note 196. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 473.318 (West 1991) (amended
1997); Mich. Comp. Laws § 339.733(1) (\Vest 1997). In an exceptional case, account-
ants were held to be entitled to a retaining lien, under an artisan's lien statute, on
books that had been enhanced in value. See Myra Found. v. Harvey, 100 N.W.2d 435,
439-40 (N.D. 1960).
199. Denzil Y. Causey, Jr. & Sandra A. Causey, Duties and Liabilities of Public
Accountants 99 (5th ed. 1995).
200. See M.M. v. Missouri State Bd. of Accountancy, 728 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (revoking CPA certificate when accountant failed to return records after
ordered to do so by the Board); Arnold v. Board of Accountancy, 619 P.2d 912, 917
(Or. Ct. App. 1980) (revoking license for "dishonesty," including retention of client
records). Two other cases cited in the manual are less clear about the circumstances
under which the accountant failed to turn over records or information. See Stinson v.
State Bd. of Accountancy, 625 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (censuring an account-
ant); Ward v. Ambach, 530 N.Y.S.2d 286 (App. Div. 1988) (imposing a one-year
suspension).
201. The lack of a charging lien is perhaps explicable by the fact that rarely are
members of these professions in a position to create a fund for their clients or pa-
tients. Hospitals, however, often have statutory liens on recoveries by patients against
tortfeasors. See Md. Code Ann. Com. Law II art. 16 §§ 16-601 to 16-605 (Michie 1990
& Supp 1991); N.Y. Lien Law § 189 (McKinney 1993); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 43
(West 1990 & Supp. 1998). On given projects, engineers, architects, and surveyors
may be protected by asserting mechanics' liens on real property. See Justin Sweet,




final work products if payment is not tendered.02 One real estate
broker who arranged for shopping center leases was rebuffed in an
attempt to obtain an equitable charging lien in the rents stemming
from the leases.2 0 3
Accountants have no charging lien on a client's tax refund or other
fund that the accountant was instrumental in producing,2°4 but an eq-
uitable lien will be imposed if the client promises to pay the account-
ant's fee from the fund. 0 5 In this respect, their rights are no greater
than those of anyone who has been promised payment out of a
fund.2 0 6
III. LAWYERS' LIABILITY TO EXPERT WITNESSES, COURT
REPORTERS, AND THE LIKE
An agent for a disclosed principal, acting within the scope of the
agency, is generally not liable on contracts made with third persons.
Yet, lawyers have been held liable to service providers who, when
hired, were apprised that they must look to the client for payment.
While the jurisdictions are divided on the question, 0 7 the modern ap-
proach is to hold the lawyer liable to expert witnesses, court reporters,
and other litigation-support providers unless the lawyer makes it clear
at the time the provider is retained that the provider must look only to
the client.20 8 If the lawyer does not make this clear, the "attorney has
been derelict in... preserving a good public image of the legal profes-
sion." ' 9 "Putting the burden on the attorney promotes public trust
and confidence in the legal profession. 2 10 The connection between
public trust in the profession and this rule is that the common under-
standing of the service provider is that the lawyer, as the chief strate-
202. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 11.17; Farnsworth, supra note 17,
§ 8.12. This is so unless the parties have agreed upon deferred compensation. See
Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 8.
203. See VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d 519, 527-28 (N.J. 1994).
204. See In re Myer, 106 N.Y.S.2d 688, 693 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
205. See In re Estate of Hoffman, 304 A.2d 721, 725-26 (N.J. 1973) (holding that an
accountant who was promised payment out of proceeds of income tax refund has an
equitable lien that has priority over claims of decedent's judgment creditors and ex-
wife).
206. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6, § 18.3.
207. See John H. Minan & William H. Lawrence, The Personal Liability of an Attor-
ney for Expert Witness Fees in California: Understanding Contract Principles and
Agency Theory, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 541 (1997).
208. See McCullough v. Johnson, 816 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Ark. 1991); Copp v. Breskin,
782 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Attorney's
Personal Liability for Expenses Incurred in Relation to Services for Client, 66
A.L.R.4th 256 (1988). But see Free v. Wilmar J. Helric Co., 688 P.2d 117, 120 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984) (declining to hold lawyer liable).
209. Copp, 782 P.2d at 1105 (quoting Washington State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Opinion
140 (1969)).
210. Id. at 1107.
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gist and manager of the litigation, is responsible for payment.2" Of
course, the lawyer finds it easier to engage services if the service pro-
vider knows that the lawyer will be responsible for payment, and with
the lawyer's charging lien it often will be relatively easy for the lawyer
to recover the necessary funds. It will, however, be a serious burden
to the lawyer who represents a client who does not recover a judg-
ment or the lawyer who has been dismissed prior to final judgment.
The developing case law in this area demonstrates one instance
where lawyers are burdened with a liability that is not borne by other
professionals.
Another burden that the courts have begun to thrust on lawyers is
the liability of members of the firm for the borrowings of one of their
partners from a present or past client of the firm. This is discussed
below.21
2
IV. CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE
Lawyers have always needed fees to survive, but medieval society
frowned on lawyers marketing their services. Indeed, the ban on law-
yers' marketing was stringently enforced by leaders of the profession
until recent decades. However, illicit marketing in medieval times did
not take the form of advertising.21 3 Rather, it was the financing of
litigation that was disquieting and prohibited. Blackstone described a
triad of related crimes: barratry,214 maintenance, and champerty,
where the "offender," he laments, "(as is too frequently the case) be-
longs to the profession of the law.121- These offenses involved the
211. See id. at 1106. Interestingly, advertising agencies have been held liable to the
media for the price of advertisements placed on behalf of their clients. The courts
have based this on established custom. See Midwest Television, Inc. v. Scott. Lancas-
ter, Mills & Atha, Inc., 252 Cal. Rptr. 573, 579 (Ct. App. 1988); Toledo Broadcasting,
Inc. v. Stockton, West & Burkhart, Inc.. 572 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Ohio Hamilton County
Mun. Ct. 1990).
212. See infra notes 322-31 and accompanying text.
213. Lawyers' advertising was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. However, the ban on advertising was held to be a violation of the First Amend-
ment's free speech clause in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Later cases have
broadened further the advertising rights of lawyers. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472-78 (1988).
214. Blackstone calls it "barretry," but his spelling appears aberrant. 4 William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 133-34 (photo. reprint 1993)
(1769).
215. Id Although these offenses are not limited to lawvyers, two centuries after
Blackstone, a commentator notes that the terms champerty and maintenance "have
come to be applied almost exclusively to the activities of lawyers." F.B. MacKinnon,
American Bar Found., Contingent Fees for Legal Services 37 (1964). Interestingly,
the Saladini case, cited below, appears to involve only lay persons. It is the most
clear-cut case of champerty in recent times that I have seen.
Although lawyers may have been the major culprits in Blackstone's time, it is likely
that the first rules against maintenance were aimed at the rich and powerful. See R.D.
Cox, Champerty as We Know It, 13 Memphis St. L. Rev. 139 (1983) (concentrating on
champerty and real property rules); Max Radin, Maintenance by Chaniperty, 24 Cal.
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stirring up of litigation (barratry), the financing of litigation (mainte-
nance), and the splitting of the fruits of litigation (champerty).
This arcane chapter of the law is rarely, if ever, played out in the
criminal courts. Rather, the issue usually surfaces by way of a defense
of illegality to a claim for payment of a fee or for breach of contract.
There is an obvious tension between the growth of free assignability
of assets and the doctrine of champerty. There is also tension between
the legality of contingent fees and the illegality of the barratry, main-
tenance, and champerty triad. The triad has become incoherent.
21 6
Corbin squares the prohibition against champerty and the legality of
the contingent fee in this language: "a bargain is not champertous if
the contingent fee is not a share of the money or other thing recov-
ered but is merely measured by a specified percentage of the value of
the recovery. ' '2 17 This nicely finesses the issue, but when one recalls
that the lawyer has a charging lien in the sum recovered, Corbin's dis-
tinction becomes rather flimsy. Indeed, many jurisdictions hold that,
although a lawyer cannot enforce a champertous contract, the lawyer
may recover the reasonable value of his or her services in quasi-con-
tract for services rendered under such a contract.2t 8 The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial court abolished the triad of offenses in 1997.19
In so doing, the court quoted from an earlier decision which had noted
that "the decline of champerty, maintenance, and barratry as offences
is symptomatic of a fundamental change in society's view of litiga-
tion-from 'a social ill, which, like other disputes and quarrels, should
be minimized' to 'a socially useful way to resolve disputes.' 2
2 0
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provides for a lim-
ited survival of the ban on champerty. Lawyers may not acquire a
proprietary interest in the client's cause of action.22 ' The Restate-
ment, however, does not forbid the assignment of a cause of action by
a client to the client's lawyer provided that the lawyer had not repre-
sented the client in asserting the claim. 222 As to maintenance, it au-
L. Rev. 48 (1935); Percy H. Winfield, The History of Maintenance and Chiamperty, 35
L.Q. Rev. 50 (1919).
216. Incoherent, but not dead. If the precise terms of the rule in a particular juris-
diction are violated, the champertous agreement will not be enforced. Thus, where a
counterclaim was assigned to a defendant who could pursue the counterclaim at his
own expense and retain a portion of the proceeds, the counterclaim was dismissed.
See Kenrich Corp. v. Miller, 377 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1967); see also Ehrlich v. Rebco
Ins. Exch., Ltd., 649 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (App. Div. 1996) (stating that assignment of a
counterclaim that could not have been brought in an original action violates chain-
perty statute), appeal dismissed, 680 N.E.2d 618 (N.Y. 1997).
217. 6A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1422 (1962).
218. See In re Kamerman, 278 F.2d 411, 413-14 (2d Cir. 1960).
219. See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997).
220. Id. at 1226 (quoting F.B. MacKinnon. American Bar Found., Contingent Fees
for Legal Services 210 (1964)).
221. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 48(1) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
222. Id. cmt. b.
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thorizes lawyers to advance litigation expenses on behalf of clients,
even on a contingency fee basis.3 Startlingly, it authorizes the lend-
ing of money to destitute clients, despite the fact that such loans may
violate disciplinary rules. - 4 This authorization appears in square
brackets-a sign that its survival into the final draft of the Restate-
ment is still being debated. The commentary to the Restatement's
rules on champerty and maintenance warns the lawyer that its provi-
sions may conflict with state laws.
The Restatement treats the client's grant to the lawyer of literary or
media rights with respect to the representation as a "forbidden finan-
cial arrangement."'  Such a direct or indirect grant would give the
lawyer the incentive to generate the maximum publicity and suspense
surrounding the representation. It would also involve the possible dis-
closing of confidential information. The Restatement does not indi-
cate the consequences of the violation of the prohibition. Presumably,
the intention is to render such a grant void. The case law has not dealt
with the respective rights of lawyer and client to the client's story
under such a grant. Rather, it has played out in disciplinary proceed-
ings and in criminal cases on the question of effectiveness of
counsel. 26
Courts will almost certainly declare clients' grants of media rights to
be against public policy and void, because of the disciplinary rule and
the criminal cases in which grants of media rights to the lawyer pro-
voked disturbances in othervise normal proceedings. Once again, we
see a situation in which a different legal regime exists for lawyers than
for anyone else. While contract law generally holds that agreements
against public policy are void, a rule of public policy has been created
here that applies only to lawyers. As a result, members of the bar are
burdened with a prohibition that applies to no other group.
V. LICENSING AND CONTRACTS
While the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was pondering the
obsolescence of the offenses of barratry, champerty, and mainte-
nance,227 the California Supreme Court was being asked to consider
whether the need for a local license for out-of-state lawyers, who
come to California to arbitrate or settle a case on behalf of a Califor-
nia client, was obsolescent. The court answered that a local license
was needed, and the out-of-state lawyers who rendered services in
223. Id § 48(2)(a).
224. Id § 48(2)(b).
225. Id § 48(3); accord Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-104(B)
(1980); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(d) (1994).
226. The case law is described in John Gibeaut, Defend and Tell: Lawyers Who
Cash in on Media Deals for Their Clients' Stories May Wish They'd Kept Their Mouths
Shut, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 64, 64.
227. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
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California were not entitled to a fee. 22 8 Apparently, the same result
would have been obtained if they had associated with local counsel.2 9
Although the out-of-state lawyers were tainted with the charge that
they had committed misdemeanors, it is doubtful whether any prose-
cution will be brought. The forfeiture of a fee of "over $1 million,"" 0
however, is no small penalty.
Despite the national, even global, nature of the practice of law, the
decision is not surprising. It is in accord with most decisions involving
out-of-state lawyers.231 Exceptions are sometimes made, for example,
for purely federal matters.2 32 Ironically, a California statute provides
that anyone, including a lawyer from another nation, can appear for a
client in an international commercial arbitration or conciliation. 33
228. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1998).
229. The client argued "that by practicing law without a license in California and by
failing to associate legal counsel while doing so," the out-of-state lawyer violated the
statute against the unlawful practice of law. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The court,
however, stated that the result would be the same even if local counsel was associated.
Id. at 4 n.3. But see Winer v. Jonal Corp., 545 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Mont. 1976) (finding
that an attorney who had informed client that he was not licensed in Montana and
that he needed to associate with local counsel could recover fees). The wisdom of
requiring associated local counsel has been said to "tend to justify the charge that the
motive of such restrictions is 'feather bedding' rather than the protection or advan-
tage of the public." Roel v. New York County Lawyers Ass'n (In re Roel), 144 N.E.2d
24, 31 (N.Y. 1957) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
230. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 4.
231. See Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd., 342 N.E.2d 475, 480 (111. App. Ct. 1976)
(penalizing Wisconsin lawyer practicing in Illinois), affd, 362 N.E.2d 1047 (11. 1977);
Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329, 330 (N.Y. 1965) (penalizing a California lawyer prac-
ticing in New York); Ranta v. McCarney, 391 NW.2d 161,166 (N.D. 1986) (penalizing
a Minnesota lawyer practicing in North Dakota); cf. Williamson v. John D. Quinn
Constr. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (limiting an attorney's appearance to
an arbitration tribunal). But see Freeling v. Tucker, 289 P. 85 (Idaho 1930) (allowing
Oklahoma lawyer to practice in Idaho). See generally Case Note, Attorneys-Legal
Services Rendered Over Two-Week Period Within New York State by California Attor-
ney Not Violative of Penal Statute as "Practice of Law" and Are Compensable, 33
Fordham L. Rev. 483, 486-87 (1965) (discussing a case that permitted an out-of-state
attorney to recover fees for practicing in New York that was later reversed on appeal);
C.D. Sumner, Annotation, Right of Attorney Admitted in One State to Recover Com-
pensation for Services Rendered in Another State Where He Was Not Admitted to the
Bar, 11 A.L.R.3d 907 (1967) (surveying the case law on fee payments to attorneys
practicing in states where they are not licensed).
232. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1965); Cowen v.
Calabrese, 41 Cal. Rptr. 441 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). But see Chandris v. Yannakakis,
668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995) (finding that an out-of-state attorney who entered into
contingent fee agreement in Florida engaged in the unauthorized practice of law).
233. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.351 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988). The represen-
tative in such a proceeding need not be a lawyer or a foreigner, but the provision is
clearly designed to make California a comfortable forum for foreign entities consider-
ing arbitration. See Albert S. Golbert & Daniel M. Kolkey, California's New Interna-
tional Arbitration and Conciliation Code: California is a More Attractive Venue for
Resolving International Commercial Disputes, L.A. Law., Nov. 1988, at 46.
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Variations of the local license problem are replicated in other pro-
fessions. Engineers, architects, and brokers who are locally non-li-
censed have also been challenged.' Nothing indicates that lawyers
receive either preferential or discriminatory treatment from the courts
as compared to the treatment of other unlicensed professionals.
Licensing requirements are created for the benefit of the public, but
their effect is often distorted to protect local practitioners. Yet, if re-
covery for out-of-state lawyers were generally allowed, unless there
were a national licensing system for lawyers, isn't it likely that one of
our states would choose to become a center for the minting of
lawyers?
VI. RELATIONS WITH OTHER LAWYERS
A. Covenants Not to Compete
A lawyer's covenant not to compete with the law firm that employs
the lawyer or of which the lawyer is a member is void.23 This is the
conclusion of all courts that have considered the matter in recent de-
234. See, e.g., Food Indus. Research and Eng'g, Inc. v. Alaska, 507 F.2d 865, 865
(9th Cir. 1974) (stating that the district court should reconsider ruling that engineer
not licensed in Alaska may not recover); Warde v. Davis, 494 F.2d 655, 658 (10th Cir.
1974) (holding that a landscape architect who was not licensed in Colorado may re-
cover fees); Hedla v. McCool, 476 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding that out-
of-state architects could not recover fees for services in Alaska); Costello v. Schmid-
Un, 404 F.2d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 1968) (holding that a New York engineer can recover for
services to a New Jersey architect); Interglobal Realty Corp. v. American Standard,
Inc., 571 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21-22 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that a New York real estate
broker cannot recover a for sale in New Jersey); Marcus & Nocka v. Julian Goodrich
Architects, Inc., 250 A.2d 739, 742 (Vt. 1960) (holding that an out-of-state architect
cannot recover fees); Badger III Ltd. Partnership v. Howard, Needles, Tammen &
Bergendorff, 539 N.W.2d 904, 910 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that an out-of-state
real estate broker cannot recover fees); Thomas J. Griffin, Annotation, Right of Ar-
chitect or Engineer Licensed in One State to Recover Compensation for Services Ren-
dered in Another State, or in Connection wiith Construction in Another State, Where He
Was Not Licensed in the Latter State, 32 A.L.R.3d 1151, 1153-54 (1970) (surveying
case law on recovery of fees by out-of-state architects and engineers).
235. See Robert W. Hillman, Law Firm Breakups § 2.3.3 (1990) [hereinafter Hill-
man, Law Firm Breakups]; Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The
Law and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 18-20 (1988); Laurel S.
Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61 Temp.
L. Rev. 1055, 1071-81 (1988); Glenn S. Draper, Comment, Enforcing Lawyers' Cove-
nants Not to Compete, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 161, 161 (1994) ("Sometimes lawyers' ethics
compel them not to keep agreements they sign." (citation omitted)); Leila EI-Hakam,
Note, Texas' Application of the Covenants Not to Compete Among Law Partners: A
Comment on Whiteside v. Griffis & Griffis, 16 Rev. Litig. 439 (1997); Christopher D.
Goble, Comment, You Can't Take It With You. Enforcing Noncomnpetition Agree-
ments Between Law Firms and Withdrawing Attorneys, 30 Land & Water L Rev. 179,
181-82 (1995); Kirstan Penasack, Note, Abandoning the Per Se Rule Against Law Firm
Agreements Anticipating Competition: Comment on Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 889, 901-04 (1992);
Elaine Marie Tomko, Annotation, Enforceability of Agreement Restricting Right of
Attorney to Compete With Former Law Firm, 28 A.L.R.5th 420, 435-37 (1995).
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cades 236 except for California.23 7 This rule is consistent with the idea
that the lawyer has no property interest in the relationship with the
client. To avoid the impact of this rule, law firms developed the tactic
of providing in partnership and employment agreements that competi-
tion by servicing clients of the firm, or starting a practice within a
specified geographical area, would result in a diminution or forfeiture
of benefits that would otherwise be paid to the departing partner or
employee. The courts have given such provisions the same treat-
ment-non-enforcement-meted out to outright restraints.233 A ma-
jor exception is that forfeiture of retirement benefits will be upheld. 39
Although the rule of non-enforcement of covenants not to compete
may be explained conceptually by the absence of a property right or
other protectible interest in the lawyer's relationship with the client,
the question of whether the rule serves any sound policy should be
raised. A provision of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
that is substantially replicated in the later Model Rules of Professional
Conduct has guided court decisions. Both documents state that no
lawyer shall be a party to a partnership or employment agreement
with another lawyer that restricts the right of the lawyer to practice
law after the termination of the relationship except with respect to
retirement benefits.240
What is the rationale for these ethical rules? Prior to the Model
Code, when the Canons of Ethics were in effect, the ABA's Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics issued Formal Opinion 300 which advised
that a covenant not to compete in an associate's contract was im-
236. See Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So. 2d 765,
767 (Ala. 1996); White v. Medical Review Consultants, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 662, 664-65
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 150-51
(N.J. 1992); Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290-91 (Or. App. 1983); Daylon L. Wel-
liver, Note, When the Walls Come a 'Tumbling Down': A Look at What Happens
When Lawyers Sign Non-Competition Agreements and Break Them, 29 Ind. L. Rev.
729, 730 (1996).
237. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993); Haight, Brown &
Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 849-50 (Ct. App. 1991). In Williams
& Montgomery, Ltd. v. Stellato, 552 N.E.2d 1100, 1106 (I11. App. Ct. 1990), the court
suggested it might uphold a similar covenant in some circumstances.
238. See Peroff v. Liddy, Sullivan, Galway, Begler & Peroff, P.C., 852 F. Supp. 239,
241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg,
461 N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (Iowa 1990); Whiteside v. Griffis & Griffis, P.C., 902 S.W.2d
739, 743-44 (Tex. App. 1995). But see Heher v. Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher and
Brennan, 672 A.2d 1147, 1153 (N.J. 1996) (enforcing the forfeiture provisions of a
partnership agreement precluding a former partner from receiving benefits if he com-
peted with the law firm, even though the provision violated public policy). The Cali-
fornia cases cited supra note 237 are forfeiture-of-benefits cases.
239. See Miller v. Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, 790 P.2d 404, 410 (Kan.
1990). The exception is based on language in DR § 2-108 of the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility and Rule 5.6(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
240. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-108 (1980); Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6 (1994).
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proper.241 Two interrelated rationales were offered. To start with,
"[c]lients are not merchandise" and attempts to "barter in clients" are
unprofessional. 242 This ethical proposition was reinforced with the ra-
tionale that the firm had little to fear from competition from a depart-
ing associate. The associate would be barred by then existing Canon 7
from attempting to "encroach upon" the clientele of the firm and Ca-
non 27 would bar the associate from soliciting its clients. 24 3
A later opinion of the Committee held a contract provision to be
improper where it restricted an employee from handling the legal
work of an established client of the firm at the time the employment
relationship ended.2 " Finally, an opinion held it improper for a part-
nership agreement to provide for restrictive covenants among part-
ners.245 No longer did the opinions indicate that the law firm was
sufficiently protected by the ban on solicitation; the opinions' whole
emphasis was now on clients' freedom to choose their own lawyers.
These opinions set the gist of the relevant provisions of the Model
Code, and later, the Model Rules. Client freedom of choice that is not
coupled with strong restraints on lawyers' luring away of clients of the
firm has created "a modem-day law firm fixture[:] the revolving
door. ' 24 6  This modem-day fixture has produced a flood of
literature.247
A patient's freedom to choose a physician would appear to be as
important as a client's ability to choose a lawyer; yet the law effectu-
ates restrictive covenants in contracts among physicians.2 '4 The rule
241. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961), reprinted in
American Bar Ass'n, Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics 658 (1967).
242. Id., reprinted in American Bar Ass'n, Opinions of the Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics 658-59 (1967).
243. Id., reprinted in American Bar Ass'n, Opinions of the Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics 659 (1967).
244. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 521 (1962).
245. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1072 (1968).
246. Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1180
(N.Y. 1995).
247. In addition to other materials cited in this section of the article, see 2 Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 7.3:202 (2d ed. Supp.
1998); Robert W. Hillman, Hillman on Lawvyer Mobility, §§ 2.1-23 (Supp. 1996);
Wolfram, supra note 5, § 16.2; Charles E. Cantu & Jared Woodfill V, Upon Leaving a
Firm" Tell the Truth or Hide the Ball, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 773, 777 (1994); Vincent Robert
Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and Associates: Tort,
Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Analysis, 5 Laws.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 107, 108 (1989) ("The firms are using other eth-
ics rules, as well as agency, partnership, and tort laws, in an attempt to put a stop to
what they view as rapacious and illegal conduct by departing lawyers.").
248. See Karlin v. Weinberg, 372 A.2d 616, 618 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977)
(basing the decision on the lack of similar constraints in the American Medical Asso-
ciation's Principles of Medical Ethics), affd, 390 A.2d 1161 (NJ. 1978); Ferdinand S.
Tinio, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contractual Restrictions on Right of
Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to Employment Agreement, 62 A.LR.3d
1014, 1020-21 (1975); Ferdinand S. "inio, Annotation, Validity amid Construction of
Contractual Restrictions on Right of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to Part-
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of non-enforcement is not applied to other professions, 49 such as ac-
countancy250 or dentistry.2 51
A thought-provoking report by the Committee on Professional Re-
sponsibility, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, chal-
lenges the notion that the underlying rationale for the ban on lawyers'
covenants not to compete is based primarily on the protection of cli-
ent choice.252 It asserts that the "client choice basis of the rule is over-
stated. ' 253 Rather, "the rule serves the salutary purpose of protecting
attorneys, particularly newer members of the bar, from bargaining
away their right to open their own office or move to another firm after
they end an association with a legal employer. 21 54 One suspects that
there is much truth in this observation, but laudable as "client choice"
and "lawyer autonomy" may be, the break-up of law firms and related
phenomena have produced much "human and professional
wreckage. "255
B. Client "Grabbing"
Associates or partners who leave their firms to join or form another
firm frequently lure clients to come with them. Usually, these clients
are those who have worked closely with the departing lawyer. This
luring away of clients occurred in some of the covenant not to com-
pete cases discussed above, but no head-on attack was made in those
cases against the practice of "grabbing" clients from the former
firm. 6 Such an attack has been made in only a few reported cases.
This is quite surprising in that the practice of grabbing clients may
conflict with basic principles of agency and partnership law. 57 The
nership Agreement, 62 A.L.R.3d 970, 975 (1975); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Va-
lidity and Construction of Contractual Restrictions on Right of Medical Practitioner to
Practice, Incident to Sale of Practice, 62 A.L.R.3d 918 (1975).
249. See Serena L. Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Noncompetition
Clauses in Professional Partnership Agreements of Accountants, Physicians and Attor-
neys, 31 Am. Bus. L.J. 31 (1993).
250. See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contractual
Restriction on Right of Accountant to Practice, Incident to Sale of Practice or With-
drawal from Accountancy Partnership, 13 A.L.R.4th 661, 663 (1982).
251. See Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 754 (N.Y. 1971).
252. See Committee on Professional Responsibility, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Ethical Issues Arising When a Lawyer Leaves a Firm: Restrictions
on Practice, 20 Fordham Urban L.J. 897, 897 (1993).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Johnson, supra note 247, at 122 (stating that such wreckage could be mini-
mized by clearer rules); see Sol M. Linowitz, The Betrayed Profession 32-33 (1994)
(pointing out the harmful effects of many lateral moves).
256. For the vocabulary of firm breakups, including the term "grabbing," see Hill-
man, Law Firm Breakups, supra note 235, § 1.3
257. For suggested changes in the Model Rules to clarify the rights and duties of
departing lawyers, see Mark W. Bennett, Note, You Can Take It With You: The Ethics
of Lawyer Departure and Solicitation of Firm Clients, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 395
(1997).
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question then becomes whether the ethical rules that stress client
choice, lawyer autonomy, and the lawyer's fiduciary duty to the client
override the rules governing fiduciary relations to one's employer or
partners under agency and partnership law."~
Some important cases hold that the agency and partnership rules
are not overridden. Thus, at its simplest, some courts have ruled that
a departing partner, who takes a client who is tied to the firm with a
contingent fee contract, has a fiduciary duty to the firm to disgorge the
fee less the percentage to which the departing partner would have
been entitled had he or she remained with the firm. 9
Where contingent fees are not an issue, but the partner prior to de-
parting solicits a client of the firm, he or she may have violated a fidu-
ciary duty to the firm even if the departing partner brought the client
into the firm and has represented the client for years. The New York
Court of Appeals, however, has suggested that lawyers who are plan-
ning to depart may inform clients with whom they have a professional
relationship about their plans and may inform the client of the right to
choose its counsel.260
At the other end of the spectrum, [however,] secretly attempting to
lure firm clients (even those the partner has brought into the firm
and personally represented) to the new association, lying to clients
about their rights with respect to the choice of counsel, lying to part-
ners about plans to leave, and abandoning the firm on short notice
(taking clients and files) would not be consistent with a partner's
fiduciary duties .... 261
Such a breach would give rise to actions for damages for breach of
contract, and constructive trusts for violations of fiduciary duties, but
the court did not address itself to remedies, merely denying defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment. Those suggested breaches that
involve dishonesty to the firm may also be sanctionable as disciplinary
violations.262
Massachusetts has a similar nuanced approach as New York to the
fiduciary duties of departing law partners. The client's freedom of
258. The flavor of some of these cases is captured in two articles concerning the
departure of Coudert Brothers partners in Indonesia and Hong Kong. See Rex Bos-
sert, Ex-Partner Under Fire Coudert's Revenge?, Nat'l U., May 26, 1997, at A4; Lisa
Brennan, U.S., Indonesian Firms Bash Morgan's Poaching: Megafirin Runs Into
Legal, Political Buzzsav After It Opens Offices in SE Asia, Nat'l LJ.. Apr. 6, 1998, at
A13.
259. See Vowell & Meelheim, P.C. v. Beddow, Erben & Bowen, P.A., 679 So. 2d
637, 639-40 (Ala. 1996).
260. See Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskowitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179,
1183 (N.Y. 1995); cf. In re Silverberg, 438 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (App. Div. 1981) (holding
that former partners may only solicit business from former clients after dissolution of
the partnership).
261. Graubard, 653 N.E.2d at 1183-84.
262. See In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226, 234-37 (Mo. 1997) (reviewing relevant
cases).
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choice coexists with, rather than supersedes, the partners' fiduciary
duties to each other. In Meehan v. Shaughnessy,263 two members of a
law partnership decided to depart and set up a new firm. 264 Before
notifying their partners of their intentions, they quietly rented space,
borrowed money, enticed several associates to join them, spoke to a
major client and received assurances that the client would follow
them, and prepared letters to individual clients soliciting them to also
follow. 265 The letters were to be sent as soon as the departing lawyers
had notified their partners.266 During this period, one of the depart-
ing partners on three occasions had been asked by a partner whether
rumors about his planned departure were true.267 Each time, he de-
nied the truth of the rumors.268 These lies and the preemptive tactics
to grab the clients were breaches of fiduciary duties. 269 For the latter,
the court imposed the burden of proof on the departing partners to
show that the clients that followed them to the new firm would have
followed them if the old firm had had an equal opportunity to solicit
their continued patronage.270 As to instances where the new firm
could not meet the burden of proof, it would have to disgorge the
profits it made from the work done for the client. 1
In denying summary judgment to either side, the Illinois Supreme
Court in large measure followed the reasoning of the New York Court
of Appeals in a case where departing partners "grabbed" a major cli-
ent.272 A key fact that needed exploration was whether the solicita-
tion of the client took place before or after the partners withdrew. If
before, the departing partners could be liable for tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage.
In the Pennsylvania case of Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin &
Creskoff v. Epstein,273 all of the departing lawyers were associates.27'
As in Meehan, they made plans to create their own firm in advance of
terminating their association with the firm for which they were work-
263. 535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989).
264. Id. at 1257.
265. Id. at 1258-60.
266. Id. at 1259.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1265.
270. See Connors, Fiscina, Swartz & Zimmerly v. Rees, 599 A.2d 47, 50 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1991) (finding that clients would have followed the departing lawyer even if he
had not made misrepresentations to them); Meehan, 535 N.E.2d at 1269-70. But see In
re Smith, 843 P.2d 449, 452-53 (Or. 1992) (finding misrepresentations by a departing
lawyer to clients to be grounds for disciplinary action).
271. Inasmuch as the profits would go to the old firm that had been dissolved, but
not wound up, the departing partners would participate in the division of the profits
they must disgorge. See Meehan, 535 N.E.2d at 1270.
272. See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 693 N.E.2d 358 (I11. 1998).
273. 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978).
274. Id. at 1177.
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ing 75 They rented office space and borrowed money, using cases
they were handling for the firm as collateral for a loan. 76 In uphold-
ing the trial court's injunction against soliciting clients to follow them
into the new firm, the court indicated that such solicitations involved
tortious interference with the existing contracts between the clients
and the law firm. 77 The reasoning was somewhat different from the
reasoning of the court in Meehan. While the associates who joined the
departing partners in Meehan were not enjoined, a constructive trust
was placed on their profits from the cases they brought with them to
the new firm. The rationale, however, was not tortious interference
but breach of their fiduciary duties to their former employer.278
C. Tortious Interference
Because a lawyer has no property right, or right akin to a property
right, in the lawyer-client contract, it would seem to follow that inter-
ference with such a contract could not constitute a tort outside of the
cases just discussed involving interference in violation of a fiduciary
duty. The case law does not agree. 79 This may in part be explicable
by standard tort law. In many jurisdictions, an enforceable contract is
not a necessary ingredient for the tort. -  But in the interference with
the lawyer-client relationship a special policy reason also exists. In
many of the cases, the client's adversary commits the tort; an insur-
ance company, opposing counsel, the client's employer or other ad-
verse party interferes with the lawyer-client relationship. In such
cases, there is a strong analogy to the crime of obstruction of justice,
and the client is "deprived of the advice and aid of her counsel."'
Punitive damages have been assessed in such cases.2-
In one case, it was alleged that an investigator for an insurance com-
pany had convinced an accident victim's wife that a particular law firm
would do a better job than the lawyer she had already retained. She
discharged her lawyer and retained counsel suggested by the investi-
275. Id
276. Id
277. Idl at 1183-84.
278. Departing associates were found to be guilty of tortious interference with firm
contracts in Paul L. Prat4 P.C. v. Blunt, 488 N.E.2d 1062, 1067-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986),
although their conduct appears to have been ethically correct.
279. See generally Eugene Mullins, Note, The Attorney as Plaintiff. Tortious Inter-ference with Contract and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 55 Ky. 1.J. 682 (1967) (not-
ing that courts consider a number of policies in evaluating an attorney's tortious
interference claim); Phoebe Carter, Annotation, Liability in Tort for Interference with
Attorney-Client Relationship, 90 A.L.R.4th 621, § 3 (1991) (explaining that interfer-
ence with the attorney contract gives rise to liability in tort).
280. It was established early that at-will employees are protected against interfer-
ence with their employment relationship. See Moran v. Dunphy, 59 N.E. 125 (Mass.
1901); Jones v. Leslie, 112 P. 81 (Wash. 1910).
281. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 489 P.2d 837, 841 (Ariz. 1971).
282. See id at 843.
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gator. The court held that the investigator for the adverse party and
the new counsel would be liable for the tort of interference with the
first lawyer's contract if it were to be proved that they knew that a
lawyer had already been retained.283 These are routine cases of tor-
tious interference. They establish that the at-will lawyer-client con-
tract is nonetheless a relationship in which the lawyer has a pecuniary
interest.284
If the alleged tortfeasor is a competing lawyer, the result may be
different. The lawyer-client relationship is generally at-will and client
choice as to representation or counseling is among the key values of
the legal system. There is tension between that value and standard
tort thinking.28 However, if the first lawyer has a charging lien on
any judgment or settlement, and if the second lawyer disburses the
proceeds to the client in disregard of the lien, then a tort claim has
been made out.2 86 Conversely, where a law firm unjustifiably sent a
"lien letter" to a lawyer's major client, causing the client to withhold
payment from the lawyer, the firm was liable for tortious
interference.287
D. Whistle Blowing
Absent an agreement to the contrary, hiring in the United States is
at-will. 288 This includes contracts hiring lawyers as associates or as
corporate counsel. Many, perhaps most, jurisdictions, however, have
carved out a public policy exception. If an at-will employee is dis-
charged for reasons that violate public policy, the discharge is a legal
wrong which can be described as either a tort or a breach of contract.
Among the discharges that have been held to violate public policy are
283. See Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Ni-
land, Teerlink & Bell, 138 Cal. Rptr. 670, 673-74 (Ct. App. 1977).
284. Because the client's contract with the lawyer is enforceable by the client, when
a third party tortiously interferes, causing the lawyer to withdraw, the client has an
action against the third person. See Erlandson v. Pullen, 608 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Or.
App. 1980).
285. See, e.g., Potts v. Mitchell, 410 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (W.D.N.C. 1976) (holding
that the attorney-client relationship may always be terminated with the client's con-
sent, with or without cause); Brown v. Larkin & Shea, P.A., 522 So. 2d 500, 501 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (denying the lawyer a legal right to a continuing relationship with
a client under an at-will contract); Walsh v. O'Neill, 215 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass. 1966)
(stressing client choice); Madorsky v. Bernstein, 626 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993) (granting co-counsel who could not work together the privilege to inform cli-
ents of their ability to choose their preferred representation); Skonkin & Melena Co.
v. Zaransky, 614 N.E.2d 807, 816 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding a departing lawyer
not liable for sending letters to clients offering representation and "one fee" for him-
self and the former firm). But see Anderson v. Anchor Org. for Health Maintenance,
654 N.E.2d 675, 685 (111. App. 1995) (upholding a cause of action where a discharged
attorney brought suit against former co-counsel).
286. See Pearlmutter v. Alexander, 158 Cal. Rptr. 762, 764 (Ct. App. 1979); Weiss
v. Marcus, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (Ct. App. 1975).
287. See Winiemko v. Valenti, 513 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
288. See 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 4.2 (rev. ed. 1993).
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"whistleblower" cases where the employee has been discharged in re-
taliation for reporting the employer's illegal activities to the authori-
ties or to higher management. 9 New York has rejected the trend and
has denied relief to whistle blowers.219 Delaware has adopted a very
narrow concept of abusive discharge.29 Yet, the status of lawyer-em-
ployees in the context of whistle blowing is different from the status of
other employees in those jurisdictions. In New York, an associate,
who claimed to have been discharged for insisting on reporting uneth-
ical behavior of a fellow associate to state disciplinary authorities, was
held to have stated a cause of action.2  In Delaware, house counsel,
under a hiring at-will, stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge
by alleging that she was fired for reporting the organization's legally
inappropriate activity to the board of directors.293 Both decisions
were based on the lawyer-employee's professional obligations under
the applicable state ethical rules.2 94 In contrast, Illinois, which whole-
heartedly provides remedies for retaliatory discharges, has refused to
allow an action by house counsel who reported the company's impor-
tation of substandard kidney dialyzers to the FDA after telling com-
pany officers he would do so.29S The Illinois court relied on the rule
that lawyers can always296 be discharged, and on the thought that the
allowance of an action for retaliatory discharge would inhibit frank
and open discussion between corporate officers and house counsel.
Although Illinois differed from New York and Delaware, all three
states carved out a rule for lawyers that differed from the rule applied
to everybody else.
The rationale expressed by the court in Wieder was that an implied
term of the contract between the firm and its associate is that both will
act "in accordance with the ethical standards of the profession," and
any disincentives to such conduct "would subvert the central profes-
289. See, e.g., Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds. Inc., 538 A.2d 1292, 1298-99 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1988) (holding that the discharge of an employee who reported safety
conditions to OSHA violated public policy).
290. See Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1987); Murphy v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983). Legislation subse-
quent to Murphy protects a whistle blower only if he or she reports, testifies to, or
objects to a violation that "creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to
the public health or safety." N.Y. Labor Law § 740(2)(a)-(c) (McKinney 1988).
291. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 442 (Del.
1996).
292. See Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 109, 111 (N.Y. 1992) (relying on New
York's version of DR 1-103(A), which requires a lawyer to report knowledge "that
raises a substantial question as to another lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness
in other respects").
293. See Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, 652 A.2d 578, 585-89 (Del. Ch. 1994).
294. Rule 1.2 of the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited a lawyer
from assisting a client in engaging in any conduct that is "criminal or fraudulent." Id.
at 588. For the New York rule, see supra note 292.
295. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ill. 1991).
296. See supra notes 9-11.
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sional purpose of [the associate's] relationship with the firm-the law-
ful and ethical practice of law. '29 7 Thus, lawyers are different from
everyone else because of "the unique function of self-regulation be-
longing to the legal profession. 2 98 Most states that have come to
grips with the issue have adopted the New York approach.2 99
VII. LAWYER-CLIENT CONTRACTS OTHER THAN RETAINERS-
PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE
In the words of one court, "although it is not advisable, an attorney
may also contract with a client with respect to matters not involving
legal services, or in addition to legal services."3 0 Unlike in the case of
a retainer agreement, the client cannot terminate such an agreement
without cause.30 1 Why, then, is it "not advisable" for a lawyer to con-
tract with a client? The reason is that, because of the fiduciary duty
that the lawyer owes the client, there is a heavy burden of proof on
the lawyer to show that the transaction is free of undue influence.30 2
"Lawyers cannot act like other people, at least not when doing busi-
ness." 30 3 They share this disability with other fiduciaries.304
If the transaction is called into question, the lawyer must show: (1)
that the transaction was fairly and equitably conducted; (2) that the
lawyer fully informed the client of the nature and consequences of the
transaction; (3) that the lawyer fully revealed the lawyer's own inter-
est in the matter; and (4) that the lawyer saw to it that the client ob-
tained independent advice or gave the client the kind of advice a
disinterested lawyer would have given the client.3 5 Other courts dis-
pense with the need for undue influence, and hold that if the lawyer
"got the better of the bargain," the agreement can be invalidated un-
less the lawyer "can show that the client was fully aware of the conse-
297. Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 108.
298. Id.
299. See Damian Edward Okasinski, Annotation, In-House Counsel's Right to
Maintain Action for Wrongful Discharge, 16 A.L.R.5th 239, § 4(a) (1993).
300. Greene v. Greene, 436 N.E.2d 496, 499 (N.Y. 1982) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
301. See id.
302. Exceptions are made for routine transactions such as where the lawyer makes
a purchase in the ordinary course of business from a client who is a storekeeper.
303. Barry S. Martin, The Evils of Lawyer-Client Deals, Cal. Law., Dec. 1987, at 53,
53.
304. See Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 539, 541-42
(1949). "Thus if a trustee sells trust property to himself individually, the consent of the
beneficiary to the sale will not prevent him from setting aside the sale.... if the price
and all other conditions of [the] sale were not fair and reasonable." Id. at 542. Note,
however, that Scott discusses dealings with trust property, not with a contract be-
tween trustee and beneficiary concerning matters outside the trust relationship.
305. See Israel v. Sommer, 197 N.E. 442, 447 (Mass. 1935).
[Vol. 67
1998] LAWYER'S CONTRACTS ARE DIFFERENT 487
quences and that there was no exploitation of the client's
confidence."3 °6
There is no lack of other formulations,0 7 but the underlying reason-
ing is that a business transaction between lawyer and client is pre-
sumptively "invalid" (i.e., voidable),3 8 as is a testamentary provision
in favor of the lawyer who prepared the will.31 Thus, a loan made by
a lawyer to a client is presumptively voidable and, if the presumption
is not rebutted, the client must repay only the principal and the cost of
the money to the lawyer.310 Courts in some cases have held that the
presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
As stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the presumption "can be
overcome by only the clearest and most convincing evidence showing
full and complete disclosure of all facts known to the attorney and
absolute independence of action on the part of the client. '311
Aside from the possible avoidance of the transaction with the client,
the lawyer may face disciplinary charges,3 2 and even disbarment.1 3
The promulgated standards that govern lawyer-client contracts do not
have the force of contract law,314 and some courts have rejected their
306. Greene v. Greene, 436 N.E.2d 496, 499 (N.Y. 1982) (quoting Howard v. Mur-
ray, 38 N.Y.2d 695, 699 (1976)).
307. See, e.g., Bell v. Ramirez, 299 S.W. 655, 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (applying a
presumption of fraudulence).
308. P & M Enters. v. Murray, 680 A.2d 790, 791 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
Although the courts speak of "invalidity," they tend to use the term loosely. Since the
legal foundation is "undue influence," such transactions are merely voidable at the
election of the client. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 207
cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996): Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6,
§§ 9.9-9.12; Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 4.20.
309. See Krischbaum v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d 1291. 1297-98 (Ohio 1991).
310. See Murray, 680 A.2d at 791-92 (discussing that where the agreed interest rate
was 16.5%, the cost of money to the lender was presumably less). But see Fanaras
Enters. v. Doane, 666 N.E.2d 1003, 1004 (Mass. 1996) (holding that a loan made by a
client to a retained lawyer not part of the lawyer-client relationship). See id. at 1006.
Thus, the lawyer's malpractice insurer was not liable for the lawyer's non-payment.
See id.
311. In re Gavel, 125 A.2d 696, 703 (NJ. 1956) (disciplinary case) (citations omit-
ted); cf. Monco v. Janus, 583 N.E.2d 575, 581-82 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) (shifting the
burden of persuasion to the client only after clear and convincing evidence has rebut-
ted the presumption). But see Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 448
N.E.2d 872, 878 (I11. 983) (holding that once clear and convincing contrary evidence
is introduced in a will contest, the presumption disappears and evidence is evaluated
neutrally).
312. See In re Harper, 485 S.E.2d 376, 380 (S.C. 1997) (imposing a 60-day suspen-
sion for a questionable property transaction where there was no evidence that the
client had any understanding of the nature of the transaction).
313. See In re Wolk, 413 A.2d 317, 318 (NJ. 1980) (finding that a lawyer had coun-
seled his client "to make a hopeless investment in a building in which he had an
interest, and concealed material information from her, including the fact of a
foreclosure").
314. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide:
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applicability to civil litigation,315 but others have applied them to civil
disputes, either as directly applicable standards 316 or as evidence of
proper contractual conduct.31 7 Nonetheless, the cases involving disci-
plinary action and the cases involving contract remedies use remarka-
bly similar reasoning, and the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers appears to synthesize them into a coherent whole. 3t 8 This
Article opened with a quotation from Sir Francis Bacon to the effect
that clients entrust lawyers, as counselors, "with the whole" of their
being. It is in the context of the lawyer-client business contract that
the quotation has the greatest resonance.
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or know-
ingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest
adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the
client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of in-
dependent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(a) (1994).
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility contains a similar, but less detailed,
rule which provides: "A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a
client if they have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to
exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the
client has consented after full disclosure." Model Code of Professional Responsibility
DR 5-104(A) (1980).
315. In Garwood v. Johnson, No. L93-031, 1994 WL 138434, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 15, 1994), the court states:
Appellee relies heavily on the violation of two disciplinary rules contained in
the Code of Professional Responsibility as a ground for vacating the judg-
ment against him. However, we point out that these violations, if they in fact
occurred, are not defenses and furthermore they are not even counterclaims.
Ethical violations fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Com-
missioners of Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Id.; see also Buffalo v. Blackmon, No. CA 93-155, 1994 WL 14583, at *3 (Ark. Ct.
App. Jan. 12, 1994) (stating that a defendant may not rely on alleged violations of the
Model Rules as a defense); Mozzochi v. Beck, 529 A.2d 171, 176 n.8 (Conn. 1987)
(citing the amended preamble of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that the Rules are designed to provide guidance and structure, not a basis
for liability); Smith v. Bitter, 319 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Iowa 1982) (stating that "[e]ven a
violation of professional ethics ... would not subject [a defendant] to the penalty of
forfeiting an otherwise valid business interest"); Tanasse v. Snow, 929 P.2d 351, 355
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "[v]iolations of the Rules [of Professional Conduct]
do not provide an aggrieved party with a cause of action").
316. See Schlanger v. Flaton, 631 N.Y.S.2d 293, 296-97 (App. Div. 1995), appeal
denied, 666 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1996).
317. See Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 376-79 (Iowa 1987).
318. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 207 (Proposed Fi-
nal Draft No. 1, 1996).
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There is no per se rule prohibiting lawyers from contracting with
their clients in matters beyond the rendering of legal services. 319 In a
proper case, the court will even grant specific performance to the law-
yer.32 Even if the transaction is valid and violates no disciplinary
rule, the contract will, however, be strongly construed against the law-
yer who drafted it.321
VIII. PARTNERSHIP LIABILIT-Y FOR CLIENT BUSINESS CoNTRAcTs
If the lawyer's violation of the disciplinary standards with respect to
contracting with a client can be characterized as negligence within the
scope of that lawyer's partnership authority, then the liability of the
firm and its malpractice insurer is engaged. This is precisely the tactic
the plaintiff employed in Phillips v. Carson.32 Carson, plaintiff's law-
yer and a law firm member, borrowed approximately $275,000 from
his client, secured by a mortgage on Carson's property which Carson
did not record.3" At no time did Carson suggest that his client seek
independent advice, nor did he advise her of four prior mortgages on
the property that secured his client's mortgage. 2 4 Other counts of
wrongful omission and commission were also proved.3- - Carson filed
for bankruptcy, leaving little hope that he would repay any part of the
loan.326
The court held that it was a question of fact whether Carson's activi-
ties concerning the loan, including the advice he gave and the advice
he failed to give, were within the scope of his apparent authority to
bind the partnership.327 Among the indicia of apparent authority
were the facts that the transaction took place in the firm's offices, cor-
respondence was on firm stationery, and the clerical personnel work-
319. See Howard v. Murray, 346 N.E.2d 238, 239 (N.Y. 1976) (upholding trial court
findings that the lawyer had dealt openly and frankly with the client, although the
lawyer got the better of the bargain).
320. See Clifton Country Rd. Assocs. v. Vinciguerra, 600 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984-85
(App. Div. 1993) (holding that a lawyer did not have "unclean hands" when profes-
sional relationship was tenuous, no confidential information was abused, and the law-
yer was not guilty of wrongdoing); Alala v. Peachtree Plantations, Inc., 355 S.E.2d
286, 289-90 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
321. See Shaffer v. Terrydale Management Corp., 648 S.W.2d 595, 600-09 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983) (finding that the lawyer-stockholder was an employee within the meaning
of the contract he drafted although he was not an employee in the usual sense); Rog-
ers v. Niforatos, 394 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476 (App. Div. 1977).
322. 731 P.2d 820 (Kan. 1987); see Roach v. Mead, 722 P.2d 1229, 1232-34 (Or.
1986) (holding that agency principles create liability on the part of law firm for wrong-
ful act of partner).
323. Phillips, 731 P.2d at 823.
324. Id. at 828.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 824.
327. Id. at 825-29, 836.
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ing on the matter were the same as those who worked on the probate
of the plaintiff's late husband's estate.328
Other theories of firm liability on similar facts include breach of
fiduciary duty,32 9 and breach of contract.330 Earlier cases had denied
liability on the theory that business ventures were outside the scope of
a law partnership's activities. The more modern cases view a law part-
nership, for purposes of vicarious liability, as a business venture. 33'
IX. RATIONALE FOR THE PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE
Four strands of thought have been advanced either severally or con-
joined to justify the creation of the presumption of undue influence in
contracts between lawyer and client and the promulgation of related
disciplinary standards. These are: (1) the assumption by the client
that the lawyer has no interest that conflicts with the client's own in-
terests; (2) the ability of the lawyer to dominate the client; (3) the
existence of the lawyer's fiduciary duty; and (4) the need to instill con-
fidence in the system for the administration of justice.
A. Client's Assumption
Courts have justified the presumption of undue influence by assert-
ing that clients are entitled to assume that the lawyer does not have
interests that conflict with their own. In a disciplinary proceeding that
resulted in the disbarment of a New Jersey lawyer, the court reviewed
the lawyer's conduct with respect to the widow of a longtime client.332
After her husband's death, she asked the lawyer for advice on how to
invest the proceeds of his estate.333 The lawyer suggested that she
invest by making a second mortgage loan in the amount of $10,000 to
the owner of a particular multiple dwelling.334 He had a one-quarter
interest in the corporation that owned the building.3 35 At some point
in his dealings he informed the widow that he had an interest in the
corporation, but concealed the fact that the corporation had recently
purchased the building for $8000, taxes were in arrears, and the build-
328. Id. at 834, 836.
329. See Cook v. Brundidge, Fountain, Elliott & Churchill, 533 S.W.2d 751, 757-59
(Tex. 1976).
330. See Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, 209 S.E.2d 795, 796-97 (N.C. 1974) (involv-
ing counts for breach of contract and breach of trust where money was entrusted to
senior partner for investment).
331. See Stephen E. Kalish, When a Law Firm Member Borrows from a Client-
The Law Firm's Responsibility: A Professional Model Replaces a Club Model, 37 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 107, 125 (1988); Annotation, Liability of Professional Corporation of
Lawyers or Individual Members Thereof, for Malpractice or Other Tort of Another
Member, 39 A.L.R.4th 556, 557-60 (1985).
332. See In re Wolk, 413 A.2d 317, 319-22 (N.J. 1980).
333. Id. at 319.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 320.
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ing was a dilapidated slum. 33 6 Moreover, the second mortgage, which
he drafted, contained a clause subordinating the loan to possible fu-
ture mortgages.3 3 7 After disciplinary charges were filed, the lawyer
made arrangements for repayment, but this fact did not prevent his
disbarment for this and other malefactions. 338
In disbarring the lawyer, the court concluded that it was proper for
the client to presume that her lawyer was acting exclusively in her best
interest.339 It quoted Justice Story:
When a client employs an attorney, he has a right to presume, if the
latter be silent on the point, that he has no engagements, which in-
terfere, in any degree, with his exclusive devotion to the cause con-
fided to him; that he has no interest, which may betray his
judgment, or endanger his fidelity.340
Although the lawyer at one point suggested that the widow seek
independent advice, the court noted that the lawyer's statement in this
regard "appears designed to protect him rather than his client. Re-
spondent cannot shield himself behind the glib recitation of a disclo-
sure the practical meaning of which was unknown to his client. ' 341 As
another court put it:
"Full disclosure" includes a clear explanation of the differing inter-
ests involved in the transaction and the advantages of seeking in-
dependent legal advice. It also requires a detailed explanation of
the risks and disadvantages to the client entailed in the agreement,
including any liabilities that will or may foreseeably accrue to
him.
3 4 2
B. The Ability of the Lawyer to Dominate the Client
Cases of undue influence, outside the context of lawyer-client rela-
tions, fall into two roughly drawn categories. 3 In one class of cases, a
dominant party uses a dominant psychological position to induce the
subservient party to enter into a transaction that the subservient party
would not otherwise have consented to. In the second class, one party
uses a position of trust and confidence-such as a fiduciary duty-to
unfairly persuade the other into a transaction. At times, the two
classes coalesce. The dominant party may dominate primarily because
336. Id. at 319-20.
337. Id. at 319.
338. See i. at 318, 320 n.6. This wonder also managed to record 117 billable hours
in a five day period. Id. at 318.
339. Id. at 321.
340. Id. (quoting Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386, 1390 (C.C. Me. 1824) (No.
17,733) (Story, J.)).
341. Wolk, 413 A.2d at 321.
342. Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 845 (D.C. 1994) (quoting In re James, 452
A.2d 163, 167 (D.C. 1982)).
343. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 6. § 9.10.
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of the trust and confidence engendered in the subservient party. The
two classes of cases replicate themselves in lawyer-client transactions.
As a contract principle, the stronger (dominant) party has an obli-
gation to demonstrate that he or she did not take advantage of the
weaker one. In one case, a lawyer, Hulnick, was appointed adminis-
trator of the estate of Henry Gee, who had died intestate. 344 Hulnick
failed to produce a detailed accounting, but caused his clients, the sole
distributees, to sign a release reciting that they had received roughly
forty percent more from the estate than they really had.345 The three
distributees were elderly; each was more than seventy-five years old
and the oldest was eighty-seven. Putting aside alternative grounds for
setting aside the release involving interpretation of the release and
fraudulent misrepresentations, the court said:
In all cases of this nature wherever, "the relations between the con-
tracting parties appear to be of such a character as to render it cer-
tain that they do not deal on terms of equality ... it is incumbent
upon the stronger party to show affirmatively that no deception was
practiced, no undue influence was used, and that all was fair, open,
voluntary and well understood.' 34 6
Similarly, in a disciplinary case, In re Wolk,34 7 the court focused on
the inequality of the parties, pointing to the client's total dependence
on her lawyer, among other factors, including that the lawyer had
failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence when he induced
her to invest in a second mortgage on property in which the lawyer
had an interest.348 Besides discussing the client's "dependence," '349
the court also stated "she was relying not only upon his advice but
upon his judgment and upon the confidence she had in him based on
his past [sixteen] years of service as her late husband's attorney. '35 0
This combination of "dependence" and "confidence" is not an unu-
sual combination in the case law.
344. See In re Gee's Estate, 46 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sur. Ct. 1943).
345. The court did not resolve the conflict of testimony. Gee claimed, although it
was disputed, that
[Wjhen he attempted to read the paper he was told by Hulnick that the
latter was in a hurry and it would take too long. When Gee asked him what
it was, he was told that Hulnick had to present it to the judge to show the he
had given the distributees their checks.
Id. at 666.
346. Id. at 665 (emphasis added) (quoting Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91, 99-100
(1878)).
347. 413 A.2d 317 (N.J. 1980).
348. The court wrote that "[g]iven the widow's total dependence upon respondent,
the one-sidedness of the transaction, the financial realities of a $10,000 investment in
a building worth perhaps half that sum .... He should have insisted that she retain
independent counsel or refused to consummate the transaction." Id. at 321.
349. Id. at 321.
350. Id. at 320.
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C. The Existence of a Fiduciary Duty
No one would contest that a lawyer-client relationship creates fidu-
ciary duties owed by the lawyer to the client. Thus, one finds cases
setting aside transactions where no evidence of unfairness, non-disclo-
sure, or the like, is presented. This is because it is incumbent on the
lawyer to produce the evidence absolving himself or herself from the
presumption of undue influence. In Blasche v. Himelick,351 all we can
discern from the printed report of the case is that the client, while
allegedly infirm and feeble, conveyed realty to his lawyer on May 28,
and died on August 15 of the same year.35 2 The client's heirs thereaf-
ter brought suit to cancel the deed.353 The lawyer died before trial.3r
The court ruled that, as a matter of law, a case of undue influence had
been made out.35 5 The court explained:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher
trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or, generally
speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more
anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by sterner principles of
morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer
them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious,
to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detri-
ment or prejudice of the rights of the party best owing it.356
D. The Need to Instill Confidence in the System for the
Administration of Justice
A theme that sounds in many lawyer-client disputes ruled on by
courts is that special rules governing lawyer conduct are designed, in
part, to forward the states' interests in the administration of justice.
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,3"' the United States
Supreme Court examined the validity of state bar associations' role in
enforcing professional standards. Although the context was different
from that of lawyer-client contracts, the Court's discussion is applica-
ble to and supports the presumption of undue influence in the forma-
tion of contracts between lawyers and their clients:
[T]he State bears a special responsibility for maintaining standards
among members of the licensed professions. "The interest of the
States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are es-
sential to the primary governmental function of administering jus-
tice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts."' While
351. 210 N.E.2d 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965).
352. Id. at 380.
353. Id
354. Id. at 379.
355. 1I at 381.
356. Id. at 381 (quoting Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850)).
357. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
1998]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
lawyers act in part as "self-employed businessmen," they also act
"as trusted agents of their clients .... .358
X. CONCLUSION
This Article does not seek to capture all situations in which litiga-
tion about lawyers' contracts arise. Worthy of treatment are the crea-
tion of the lawyer-client relationship, which may be non-contractual,
and contracts where the lawyer deals at arms' length with a non-client,
but seeks to secure a special advantage because of the lawyer's special
knowledge.3 19 Most of the multiple problems of interpretation 360 and
validity36' of contingency-fee agreements have not been discussed.
The doctrine of account stated is often applied differently to lawyers'
bills than to bills sent by, for example, lumber yards; because of the
fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client, courts appear reluc-
tant to find assent to a lawyer's bill. 62
The ability of a lawyer to purchase or sell a practice is an important
topic that is not dealt with in this Article. This Article also ignores the
rights third parties may have as third party beneficiaries of the lawyer-
client retainer. 63 One could further multiply issues, but this Article
has dealt with significant issues in lawyers' contracts and has been ex-
tensive enough to reveal significant differences between general con-
tract law and the treatment of lawyers' contracts.
Lawyers are treated differently from other litigants by their broth-
ers and sisters on the bench. Often, the rules governing their con-
tracts place lawyers under a disadvantage as compared to other
contracting parties. Their expectancies in executory retainer agree-
358. Id. at 460 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975),
and Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961)).
359. See, e.g., Joyner v. Vitale, 926 P.2d 1154, 1155 (Alaska 1996) (holding an attor-
ney who purchased property liable to a third party beneficiary); Canaras v. Lift Truck
Servs., 322 A.2d 866, 868 (Md. 1974) (limiting the liability of a client to an attorney
under an employment contract).
360. See Vonde M. Smith Hitch, Comment, Ethics and the Reasonableness of Con-
tingency Fees: A Survey of State and Federal Law Addressing the Reasonableness of
Costs as They Relate to Contingency Fee Arrangements, 29 Land & Water L. Rev. 215
(1994).
361. See generally Symposium, Contingency Fee Financing of Litigation in America:
Third Annual Clifford Seminar on Tort Law and Social Policy, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 227
(1998) (discussing contingency fee financing of litigation).
362. See Trafton v. Youngblood, 442 P.2d 648, 655 (Cal. 1968) (emphasizing fiduci-
ary duty). Compare American Druggists Ins. v. Thompson Lumber Co., 349 N.W.2d
569, 571 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (involving a lumber company and builder), with
Roehrdanz v. Schlink, 368 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (involving a lawyer
and client). But see Werner v. Nelkin, 614 N.Y.S.2d 66, 66 (App. Div. 1994) (applying
the account stated doctrine to attorney's bill)).
363. Compare Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Cal. 1961) (in bank) (recog-
nizing possibility of recovery by intended beneficiaries), with In re Estate of Pascale,
644 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889-90 (Sur. Ct. 1996) (requiring privity with the attorney and self-
evident negligence by attorney).
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ments are usually not protected. Non-refundable retainers are in-
creasingly declared to be invalid. While general contract law takes a
hands-off attitude on the question of whether an agreed price is too
high, attorneys'-fee agreements can be reviewed for reasonableness.
While citizens in other walks of life can negotiate for, and enforce,
finder's-fee agreements, the validity of attorney-referral-fee agree-
ments is circumscribed. While agents for disclosed principals are not
liable under contracts made for their principals, lawyers are liable on
the contracts they make for their clients. The lawyer who enters into a
business contract with a client has walked into an ambush. If the deal
goes sour, the lawyer is ensnared. Typically, however, in the litigated
cases, it is the client who escapes the snare set by the unscrupulous
attorney.
While the lawyer's freedom of contract is muted, contract law has
given lawyers certain privileges. They have remedial tools-retaining
liens and charging liens-that are superior than those available to
others. Lawyers are not bound by covenants not to compete and may
engage in conduct that in other occupations would result in liability
for tortious interference with contracts or with prospective advantage.
At least according to some authorities, they have great leeway to
breach their retainer agreements. Additionally, according to the same
authorities, if they breach or are disbarred, they are entitled to pay-
ment for services rendered toward completion of the contract on
terms that are much more favorable than to others similarly situated.
The overall picture is as one might expect. The scene consists of
artifacts created by lawyers whose respect and even affection for their
profession has caused them to place certain controls on fellow mem-
bers of their caste. At the same time, impelled by self-interest, it is
perhaps inevitable that they have endowed their caste with certain
preferences.
Notes & Observations
